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ASPECTS OF WAGE STABILIZATION BY THE
NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD .

David Haber*
OST economists assume that behind an unrestricted war economy lurk the dangers of inflation. Although national income
increases, so much of the country's productive effort is devoted to the
manufacture of war goods that the number of articles available for
civilian consumption necessarily diminishes. This gap between the
available supply and the existing purchasing power has the effect of
raising prices. Rising wages aggravate this situation becal!lse they increase production costs which are then passed on to the consumer in the
form of higher prices, and because, by further increasing the purchasing power of the population, they increase the gap between demand
and supply. This latter effect is especially true in a war economy, since
the extra dollars are not earned in the production of consumer goods.1
One of the solutions to the problem of inflation, therefore, seems
to be the control of wages by government regulation, designed to prevent their undue rise. And it is not surprising that when the President
on April 27, I 942 anp.ounced a general economic stabilization program
including price control, rationing and taxation, all designed to pFeyent
inflation, he also said "that stabilizing the cost of living will mean that
wages in general can and should be kept at existing scales ...." He
further added that '~ ... all stabilization or adjustment of wages will
be settled by the War Labor Board machinery .•.." 2
The War Labor Board was originally established by the President,
at the time of the United States' entry into the war, for the purpose of
achieving peaceful adjustments of labor disputes thFOugh arbitration. 8

M

*

B.S. of S.S., City College, College of the City of New York; LL.B., Yale
University. Law Clerk to Circuit Court Judge Charles E. Clark.-Ed.
1
See Gregory, "Law and Labor Relations in Wartime," in PuTrKAMMER, WAR
AND THE LAw 92 (1944).
·
2
88 CONG. REC. 3690 (1942).
8 Executive Order No. 9017, Jan. 12, 1942, reprinted in I WAR LAB. REP.
XVII (1942).
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Its only contact with wage problems was- with those incidental to the
labor disputes it handled. While the President's statement that the
board would control all wage questions was somewhat premature, since
at the time it had no contact with increases resulting from mutual
- agreement between employer and employee, his message, nevertheless,
correctly foreshadowed the very near future. For the largest share of
carrying out the policy of stabilizing the country's wages was soon to
fall on the National War Labor Board, assisted by twelve regional
boards and several industry commissions, which were to act as its subsidiary agencies.4
This came about when on October 2, I 942 an amendment to the
Emergency Price Control Act,5 subjecting all wage adjustments to
government control, was approved by the President. The implementing Executive Order 9250,6 provided that, generally, wages should
not be permitted to rise above their September 15, 1942 level, and
gave the War Labor Board jurisdiction over both voluntary and involuntary wage increases. Thus began the current system of governmental
control of wages to prevent inflation, the major aspects of which this
article will attempt to describe, analyze and evaluate.

I
GENERAL WAGE INCREASES

A. Maladjustments
Executive Ord~r 9250 permitted several exceptions to the freezing
of wages at their September 15, 1942 level. Under the first exception
the board was given authority to allow additional wage raises to correct wage "maladjustments." The concept of maladjustments was
intended to alleviate the undue burden that a strict September 15
wage freezing policy would have placed on labor as compared with
other groups in society, and particularly, on certain sections of the ·
working population whose wages had especially lagged behind an increasing cost of living. Under the concept of "maladjustments" the
board was ·to permit all increases necessary to preserve labor's standard of living, or those :which would readjust the lag of existing wages
behind a rising cost of living. The policy was designed to prevent labor
• See KALTENBORN, GovERNMENTAL ADJUSTMENT OF LABOR DISPUTES, I 15-

II7 (1943).
5
H.R. 7565, Oct. 2, 1942 (Public No. 727), 77th Congress, 2d sess., reprinted
in 4 WAR LAB. REP. VII (1943).
6

7 FED. REG. 196, p. 7871 (1942).
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from making undue gains because of its strategically advantageous
wartime position, while at the same time assuring the working man
that he would not lose all he had gained. Maladjustment increases
were further intended to put the more poorly organized or strategically
weaker employee groups, whose wages, prior to September 15, 1942,
had not kept pace with rising prices, on the same footing with other
workers who had been quick to insure themselves against a loss in
real wages due to wartime conditions.
I. The Little Steel Formula. To measure the amount of the maladjustment increase that was required in a given instance to bring
wages up to the cost of living the board resorted to the wage increment
criterion which it had earlier developed in the Little Steel cases,7
shortly after the President's April 1942 Stabilization Message. The
Little Steel formula entitled groups of employees to average an increase in straight-time hourly wage rates up to 15 per cent above those
7
In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., NWLB Nos. 30, 31, 34, 35, 1 WAR LAB. REP.
325 at 334 (1942). The board granted a 44 cents per 8 hour day, or 5.5 cents per
hour increase. 3.2 cents per hour was granted on the basis of the 1 5 per cent formula.
2.3 cents an hour was awarded because living costs in steel towns had risen more than
in the rest of the country, and because the national economic policy had precluded
bargaining on the basis of ability to pay. Id. at 327, 337. At the time of the President's Stabilization Message a three-man panel was studying the Little Steel cases.
After four and one-half months of study the panel found that the companies were
financially able to pay the union's demand for a one dollar a day wage increase, and
that up to March 15, steel workers had lost 13.3 per cent of their buying power. Id.
at 358-359, 360-361. When the panel's report was received the labor members proposed that the full one dollar wage increase be granted, but made payable in war bonds,
or that 44 cents be payable in cast, 56 cents in war bonds. Id. at 362-363. The board,
however, rejected this proposal.
Prior to the Little Steel cases the board had refrained from adopting any definite
wage policy. In the Aluminum Co. of America case, NWLB No. 66, I WAR LAB.
REP. 7 ( I 942), the elements considered were, the trend in the differential of wages
between the company's northern and southern plants over the preceding nine years,
the cost of production, the type of work, the prevailing wage rate in the area for
comparable work and the cost of living. In the cases following the Aluminum Co. of
America case, some of these criteria became distinguishable, well-defined wage stabilization policies. Of these, the International Harvester case, NWLB Nos. NDMB 4, 4-A,
89, I WAR LAB. REP. II2 (1942) and the Mead Corp. case, NWLB No. 60, I WAR
LAB. REP. 243 (1942) foreshadowed the Little Steel formula. In the Mead Corp.
case the board recognized "the need for adjusting relatively low hourly rates as an
offset to the increased -cost of living which occurred prior to the formulation of the
President's •••• program," id. at 245. In the International Harvester Co. case the
board had suggested that labor must not expect to increase or even maintain the existing level of real wages for the duration of the war. But it was also said that "labor
should not be put in an economic strait jacket during the war." I WAR LAB. REP.
I I 2 at I 20 ( I 942). This qualification seemed removed by the culmination of the
board's cost of living criterion in the Little Steel formula and its subsequent development.

1010

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43

prevailing on January 1, 1941.8 Fifteen per cent marked the rise in
the cost of living, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics from
January 1, 1941, to May 1942;_and January 1, 1941 was.chosen as
the base date, since it was ·thought to represent the end of a period of
relative economic stability and the beginning of war mobilization inflationary tendencies. 9
2. The Total Maladjustment Allowance. The board in the Little
Steel cases had assumed that the 15 per cent allowance could be consistently and continuously applied, because it was expected that, concurrently with wage control, the President's program of price control,
rationing and taxation, outlined in his April 1942 message, would be
applied so as to prevent a further rise in the cost of living.10 Nevertheless, the board, at first, permitted increases beyond and denied wage
raises up to 15 per cent on the basis of regional cost of living indices u
and such factors as the rising cost of particular work clothes.12 Later,
however, the board began to feel that to permit increases to vary with
. actual fluctuating regional costs of living would not only create obvious8
"Wage Stabilization Policy of the National War Labor Board," 4 WAR LAB.
REP. XXX (1943): "If a group of employees has received increases amounting to 15
per cent in their average straight-time rates over the level prevailing on Jan. 1, 1941,
the board will not grant further increases as a correction for maladjustments."
9
Little Steel Cos., NWLB Nos. 30, 31, 34, 35, I WAR LAB. REP. 325 at 334
(1942).
10
Id. 336. See S. Hearings on S.J. Res. 161, 77th Cong:, 2d sess., Sept. 15,
1942 (Committee on Banking and Currency). It became apparent early, however,
·that rising prices were in fact not at an end. 55 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 760, 856, 860
(1942); NWLB No. 13-280-D, IO WAR LAB. REP. 237 at 240 (1943); see also
notes 161, 162 and 163 infra.
u In re Employees Negotiating Committee, NWLB No. NDMB-31, 2 WAR
LAB. REP. 19 (1942); In re Detroit and Cleveland Navigation Co., .NWLB No.
198, 2 WAR LAB.' REP. 68 (1942); In re Koppers Co., Wood Preserving Division,
NWLB No. 342, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 220 (1942); In re General Chemical Co., NWLB
No. 267, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 387 (1942), NWLB No. 247, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 247
(1942); In re Monolith Portland Cement Co., NWLB No. 244, 4 W~R LAB. REP.
343 ( I 942); In re Diamond State Telephone Co., NWLB No. 366, 5 WAR LAB.
REP. 329 (1942).
12
In r~ General Chemical Co., NWLB No. 267, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 387 (1942),
NWLB No. 274, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 247 (1942); In re Buffalo Merchandise Warehouse, Inc., NWLB No. AR-132, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 313 (1942) (increase to compensate for unpleasant working conditions); In re Levitan Mfg. Co., NWLB No.
507, 7 WAR LAB. REP. 3-2 (1943) (rates "abnormally low" on Jan. 1, 1941_). But
strong pressure by industry or union will even now result in increases exceeding I 5
per cent, the additional amount being explained away as compensation for added
responsibility for working on night shifts. In re_ Hewitt Rubber -Corp., NWLB No.
3359-A, 14 WAR LAB. REP. I (1944); In re Carnegie-Illinois-Steel Corp., NWLB
No. 364, 2 WAR LAB. REP. 453 (1942).
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adrninistr?,tive obstacles, in requiring, for example, renewed collection
of cost of living data in each individual case, but also serve to further
inflation by providing an impetus for resumed advances in living cos~
which in turn would result in higher wages.18 Consequently, in the
"Big Four'' Meat Packing cases,14 the board indicated strongly that
the Little Steel formula was not a true cost of living criterion, and declared flatly that the sum of wage increases since January 1, 1941, or
the total maladjustment allowance, could not exceed I 5 per cent.15
Actual cost of living advances as they affected particular employee
groups were henceforth to be disregarded,16 and except for modifications subsequently explained, the formula thus interpreted, instead of
being in keeping_ with a policy of preserving labor's standard of living,
began to impose, that which was originally intended to be avoided, a
wage freeze, though this time at a level somew4at higher than that
prevailing on September 15, 1942. Today the total maladjustment
allowance is a mere arbitrary permissible maximum sum of wage rate
increases, which is to be allowed over and above the wage rate level
prevailing on January 1, 1941, and which only occasionally will permit
a wage rate above that prevailing on September 15, 1942.
3. The Net Maladjustment Allowance. The board's method of
determining the net maladjustment allowance illustrates a similar departure from the basic policies behind the Little Steel formula. While
the total maladjustment allowance constitutes the sum of all permissible increases subsequent to January 1, 1941, the net maladjustment allowance measures the amount of increase that may be awarded
a particular group of employees at a given time. This amount is de13

1,

See McNatt, "Toward a National Wartime Labor Policy'' 51 J. Pou. EcoN.

5 (1943). Mr. McNatt suggests that the application of a true cost of living for-

mula "would not solve any problems, it would only aggravate them."
14
In re Swift & Co., NWLB Nos. 186, 181, 188, 245, 187, 6 WAR LAB. REP.
395 (1943).
16
The general tenor of the opinion indicates that the Little Steel formula does
not provide for strict correlation of cost of living and straight-time hourly rates. In
part this is justified on the ground that "take-home" wages have increased sufficiently
and in part on the hope "that such a stabilization of wages will be accompanied by a
stabilization of prices"; id. at 40 I, to which the board clung despite the fact that the
national cost of living had risen approximately 19 per cent in Feb. 1943, as compared
with 15 per cent in April 1942, since January 1941.
16
Such was the view expressed in an opinion prior to the "Big Four" Meat
Packing cases, In re Hotel Employer's Assn. of San Francisco, NWLB No. 21, 5 WAR
LAB. REP. 141 (1942). Subsequent to the "Big Four" Meat Packing cases it was
expressly stated that the Little Steel formula "does not pretend to compensate wage
earners for the entire rise in the cost of living since January 1941." In re Five Pittsburgh Department Stores, NWLB No. 699 (2827-D), 9 WAR LAB. REP. 204 at 215
(1943).
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termined by offsetting against the total maladjustment allow;ance wage
increases subsequent to January 1, 1941 but prior to the date of a currently contemplated wage raise. 11 However, all prior increases have
not been offset by the board. Considerations of administrative feasibility and a policy of minimum infringement of established wage patterns demanded that certain types of increases be exempted from the
Little Steet limit, and such wage raises have, accordingly, not been
offset against the total maladjustment allqwance.18 These exemptions
have been established by the board in terms of four important criteria
of distinction. According to the first of these criteria, only wage increases reflected as ip.crements in average straight-time hourly wage
rates may be offset against the total maladjustment allowance.19 And
the second criterion permits an offset of general wage increases, only;
individual increments, even where they result in advances in average
straight-time hourly wage rates remain immune from the Little Steel
17

In computing the maladjustment allowance the employer calculates (a) the
average straight-time hourly rate of pay, (b) an amount equal to 1 5 per cent of the
figure determined in (a) above; (c) the amount to be offset against this maladjustment
allowance as "general increases" made subsequent to January 1, 1941 to all employees
or groups in the unit; ( d) the difference remaining is the maximum permissible wage
increment. APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943),
§ D-4 reprinted in l l WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXIV (1944).
18
APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943),
§ D-r(a) reprinted in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXII (1944). NWLB General
Order No. 5, issued'Oct. 14, 1942, amended May 26, 1943 reprinted in 1943 W. H.
MAN. 531; NW.LB General Order No. 6, issued Oct. 22, 1942, amended Nov. 6,
1943 id. 534. NWLB General Order No. 10, issued Nov. 6, 1942, id. 541; NWLB
General Order No. 31, issued May 26, 1943, amended Aug. 24, 1943, id. 555. Overtime payments are not subject to the Little Steel formula and neither are increments in
lieu of overtime. In re Michigan Trucking Employers Advisory Committee, (Trucking Comm. 1944) NWLB Press Release No. B-1610; In re Cleveland Draymen
Employees Assµ., Inc., (Trucking Comm., 1944) NWLB Press Release No. B-1640.
As to the nonapplicability of the Little Steel formula to bonus payments see APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMUI.A (WLB Pamphlet, 1943), § D-2(i), reprinted in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXIV (1944).
19
" • • • The cost-of-living adjustment under the War Labor Board's maladjustment policy is determined not as a percentage of average weekly wages but as a percentage of average straight-time hourly rates ...." Letter from the board in connection
with In re Gimbel Brothers, Inc., NWLB Nos. II- l 13 6, 7 WAR LAB. REP. 4 73
(1943). This case seems to have settled the issue. Similar statements may be found in
earlier cases. In re Continental Rubber Works, NWLB No. 402, 6 WAR LAB. REP.
372 at 376 (1943); In re J. I. Case Co., NWLB No. 130, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 60
at 61 (1942); In re E. H. Sheldon Co., NWLB No. 301, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 469 at
474 (1942). However, in cases involving employees whose earnings consist largely of
commissions - the board has compared earnings where these have increased without
appreciable change in effort. In re Metropolitan Life Insurance-Co., NWLB No. 1 l 15304-D, Region III, 15 WAR LAB. REP. 593 (1944).
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formula. According to the third criterion of distinction the board will
not diminish the total maladjustment allowance by subtracting therefrom prior increases granted in lieu of privileges, such as vacations, or
to bring wages back to past levels, as in the case of wage reductions
brought about by a company's poor financial condition. Finally, the
board has in some instances refused to offset increases previously
granted to eliminate "inequalities." The concept of "inequalities" will
later be discussed in detail. Suffice it to say, at this point, that this concept permitted the board, in addition to increases granted under the
Little Steel formula, to allow wage raises necessary to equalize wages
paid to groups of workers doing similar work, and to maintain wage
differentials between employees doing dissimilar work.
It is self-evident that these exemptions marked a departure from
the basic policies of the Little Steel formula. For example, wages not
reflected as increases in average straight-time hourly earnings are just
as inflationary as those which are so reflected. Their exemption is a clear
departure from the anti-inflation policy of the formula. The deviation
from the policy of preserving labor's standard of living is equally
clear. For the extent to which a wage raise goes towards meeting advancing living costs certainly does not depend on its resulting in an
increase in average straight-time hourly earnings.
While this departure from basic policies is obvious, somewhat less
obvious but far more important is the fact that these exemptions,
though to some extent motivated by a desire to facilitate administration by thus eliminating complicating factors, were to a large extent
necessitated by requirements of a wartime wage economy which the
board was unable to ignore. Thus, under its first criterion of distinction, the board has classified as increases not reflected as average
straight-time hourly wage rates, night-shift bonus wages and increments due to payments of overtime wages not previously paid 20 as
well as to liberalization of vacations with pay, and holiday pay plans.21
20
" •••• increases [ under the Little Steel formula] ...• cannot be based on the
actual wage, including overtime, received by the employees but must be based upon the
hourly wage rates received ...•" In re E. H. Sheldon Co., NWLB No. 301, 3 WAR
LAB. REP. 469 at 474 (1943); APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FORMULA (WLB
Pamphl~t, 1943), § D-2(e) reprinted in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXIII (1944).
Labor objections to the Little Steel formula were partly appeased by the issuance on
February 9, 1943 of Executive Order 9301, 8 FED. REG. 1825 (1943), which imposed
a 48 hour week in critical labor shortage areas, while continuing the requirement of
time and one-half for overtime. The Order, however, took only very gradual effect.
21
APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943),
§ D-2(a), (b) reprinted in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXIII (1944). As to the
non-applicability of the Little Steel formula and consequent non-offsettability of bonus
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Increased earnings of piece work employees where there had been no
determinable change in base rates have also been included in this classification.22 These non-offsettable increments are clearly those which go
to make up a large part of the incentive and privilege elements of
existing wage patterns. Under a wartime wage economy, in which the
bargaining power and independence achieved by labor by virtue of its
relative scarcity plays an important role, interference with these elements of the customary wage pattern might have had disastrous effects.
Certainly, the board's anti-inflation policy had to yield. The degree to
which these wage factors constitute part of the inflationary rise in wage
payments will be more fully noted in the conclusion of this article.
The board, however, has not deviated beyond the extent required by
broader economic considerations; for where privilege and incentive
elements were not involved, increases have been offset, even where
they had not been reflected as· advances in average straight-time hourly
wage rates. For example, where general wage increases given to workers. in various job classifications have not resulted in an increase in
average straight-time hourly wage rates, merely because a large labor
turnover had substituted low-paid learners for highly paid employees,
such wage raises have been classified as offsettable by the board.23
payments see id. at § D-2 (i), p. XXXIV; In re Washburn Wire Co., NWLB No.
111-298-C, 12 WAR LAB. REP. 124 (1943). See section on Methods of Wage Payments, infra at 1049-1053. But see description of a case involving Seattle-Photo Engravers Association where liberal vacation plan was approved in lieu of increase under
Little Steel formula. 7 W. H. REP. 1072 (1944).
As to night-shift premiums for rotating shifts, the board earlier required demonstration that the wage rate of rotating shift workers "did not already include compensation for the onerousness of night work. In re Globe Steel Tubes Co., NWLB No.
111-849-D, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 83 (1944). But strong pressure by the labor unions
for upward revision of the Little Steel formula forced the board to liberalize this policy.
In re Basic Steel Cos., NWLB No. 1n-623'0-D (14-1), 19 WAR LAB. REP. 568
(1945); In re Bird & Sons, Inc., NWLB No. 111-8087-D, Region I, 21 WAR LAB.
REP. 417 (1945); In re Atlas Powder Co., NWLB No. Ill- 2204-D (7-D-297),
Region VII, 8 W. H. REP. 105 (1944). This permitted an obvious loophole in the
formula. But these increases may not raise production costs and are subject to approval of the Economic Stabilization Director, unless they do not exceed 4 cents per
hour for the second shift and 8 cents for the third shift. Directive to NWLB by Office
of Economic Stabilization, March 8, 1945, 8 W. H. REP. 265 (1945).
22 In re Continental Rubber Works, NWLB No. 402, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 372
(1943). Where there has been a transition from a piecework to day-work system of
wage payments during a concern's conversion to war work, application of the formula
has been held impracticable. In re Bendix Home Appliances, Inc., NWLB No. l l 1978:-D, Region VI, 12 WAR LAB. REP. 175 (1944).
23 APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943),
§ D-1(d) reprinted II WAR LAB. REP: XXXIII (1944). Similarly, such increases
are offset when given to these workers without actual changes in job classification
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Properly understood, therefore, the board's first criterion of distinction
does not discriminate between wage increases reflected as increments
in average straight-time hourly wage rates and those not so reflected,
but rather differentiates between increases granted as a result of privilege and incentive elements in established wage patterns and other
increments. As such, the principle, rather than appearing as the arbitrary whim of an administrative agency, is seen as a deviation from
fundamental policy necessitated by economic considerations of greater
importance.
Similarly, under the board's second criterion of distinction, only
increases that make up part of the incentive and promotion pattern
have been classified as individual and non-offsettable. Thus, bona fide
merit increases based on an employee's individual productivity, automatic increases under a progression schedule based on training and
experience or advanced wage rates due to promotions, upgradings, and
adjustments in piece and individual rates following a company's job
re-evaluation,24 have not been offset.25 But mere sporadic increases
that did not involve incentive and promotion elements have not been
rates. In this respect they look like individual increases in form, but are offset because
the usual incentive or privilege element of existing wage patterns is not involved.
24
On the nature of job evaluation see pp. 1033-1034 and note 84, infra. PRENTICE
HALL LAB. SERV. 1f 56561-6577.2 (1944).
25
In re Denver Fine Clay Co., NWLB No. 2990-D(861), II WAR L~. REP.
129 (1943); In re Federal Bearing Co., Inc., NWLB No. 2705-D (ll-D-219), 9
WAR LAB. REP. 691 at 694 (1943); In re Title Guarantee and Trust Co., NWLB
No. 2774-D (646), 9 WAR LAB. REP. 457 (1943); In re Western Union Telegraph
Co., NWLB No. 909 (3058-D), 9 WAR. LAB. REP. 219 (1943); In re Worthington
Pump & Machinery Corp.,"NWLB No. 3307-A, 8 WAR. LAB. REP. 817 (1943); In
re Ohio Bell Telephone Co., NWLB No. 337, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 249 (1942); In re
National Malleable and Steel Castings Co., NWLB No. 488, 5 WAR. LAB. REP. 478
(1942) supplemented by NWLB No. 488, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 536 (1943); In re
Diamond State Telephone Co., NWLB No. 366, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 329 (1942); In
re Chrysler Corp., NWLB No. 240, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 447 (1942); APPLICATION
OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943), §§ D, D-2(d) reprinted
in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXII, XXXIII (1943). By classifying portions
of prior increases as merit or individual increases total wage rate increases exceeding
15 per cent may be achieved. In re New York Herald Tribune, NWLB No. 591,
7 WAR. LAB. REP. 9 (1943). Wage rate increases resulting from the mere acceleration
of a progression schedule where the nature of the work had not undergone considerable change have been offset. APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FORMULA (WLB
.Pamphlet, 1943), § D-1(e) reprinted in II WAR. LAB. REP. XXX at XXXIII (1944).
Such acceleration is accomplished by reducing the time for which employees are
eligible for an increase. The board permits much acceleration where in conformance
with local industrial practice. In re P. Lorilard Co., NWLB Nos. 13-212, 13-286,
13-287, I I WAR LAB. REP. 773 (1943). Profit sharing bonuses have been offset:
In re Eberhard Faber Pencil Co., NWLB No. 2-9977, 7 W. H. REP. 755 (1944).
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classified as individual and non-o:ffsettable. Wage raises which applied
to more than IO per cent of the unit's labor force,26 for example, and,
since the West Coast Airframe case,21 wage increases affecting all employees on the payroll ~s of specified dates, which had been granted
without resulting in greater productivity, and had culminated in advanced unit labor costs, have been o:ffset.28
As to the third criterion of distinction, wage rate increases such as
those granted to compensate for the elimination of general night shift
and production bonuses have been classified as non-o:ffsettable.20 This,
however, does not represent a deviation from the 6oard's anti-inflation
policy since such increases do not mean increased take-home pay but
26
In re The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Atlantic Division, NWLB No.
III-4043-D, Region III, 12 WAR LAB. REP. 544 (1943); APPLICATION OF THE
LrITLE STEEL FORMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943), § D-1 (a), reprinted in I I WAR
LAB. REP. XXX at XXXII (1944). This is not true of individual merit increases,
promotions, etc., unless such have been given in "clusters" over a very short period of
time. In order to calculate the amount to be offset because of an increase to a percentage of workers (a) take the number of employees directly affected by the increase as
a percentage of the total number in the unit at the time, (b) the amount of the increase
is then multiplied by the percentage found in (a). Thus, where a ten-cent increase is
given to 500 workers out of a 1000 in the plant, the amount to be offset would be
five-cent increase in straight-time hourly earnings ( 50 per cent of IO cents). Id. at

xxxm.
27

ln re Boeing Aircraft Co., NWLB Nos. 174, 307, 557, 558, 608, 609, 610,
LAB. REP. 581- (1943).
.
28
Most of these increases were "across the board" increments to each factory
worker in the employ of a particular company. Each worker had received a minimum
pay raise of Io cents an hour and the average increase in most plants was about I 2;½
cents an hour. The average earning increase over Jan. 1, 1941 was 18 per cent. But
this increase was not due to increments per job classification which is the usual form
of general wage increases. Mr. Morse's dissenting opinion contended that because of
the expansion of employment, the change in job classification and production methods
the Little Steel formula was inapplicable. Id. at 603, 6II. The labor members wrote
a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 617. Labor reacted unfavorably: The A.F. of L.
petitioned the board for a rehearing of the "Big Four" Meat Packing and West Coast
Airframe cases. In NWLB Press Release B-496 (1943), C.1.O. President Philip Murray stated that these cases were in "direct violation of the national wage stabili2ation
policy of the Government." NWLB Press Release B-497 (1943).
29 In re Denver Bakery Cos., NWLB No. I I 1-1772-D, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 252
(1944); APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943),
§ D-2(h) reprinted in II WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXIV (1944). Cf. In re American
Tool Works Co., 1r WAR LAB. REP. 651 (1943); Interpretation of General Order
No. 10, Question no. 14 (1942) reprinted in 1943 W. H. MAN. 541 at 543. Except
where such bonus was previously applicable only to some of the workers in the maladjustment unit. II WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXIII (1944). But a prior increase·
in lieu of a merit increase has not been offset, and the prior increase was so classified
on the dubious premise that it had not been uniformly distributed. This leaves the
road open for flagrant evasion. In re Ingersoll Rand Co., NWLB No. III-3152-D,
7 W.H. REP. 1077 (1944).
673,
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merely the substitution of one wage payment system for another. On
the other hand, the board has in many instances deviated from its
anti-inflation policy. For example, wage increases following an earlier
reduction _of pay have generally not been offset. 30 Similarly, increments given experienced workers to compensate for loss of earnings
under a group bonus system, resulting from a lowered group skill
level due to the addition of inexperienced workers, have not been
classified as offsettable.31 These exemptions were probably prompted
by the board's desire to avoid undue worker-employer friction, which
might cause work stoppages and thus interfere with the production
effort. For when war-prosperity brings back on its feet a company
that previously had to reduce wages because of its poor financial condition, the worker feels at least entitled to a restoration of his wage
cut. To follow a different policy would be straining the no-strike pledge
too much.
But once more, the board's policy has not been one of indiscriminate immunization from the Little Steel formula of all wage increases
designed to save workers from possible loss of income. In the Gi,m,bel
Brothers case,82 for example, a reduction in the number of hours worked
without a corresponding pay reduction was classified as an offsettable
pay increase. The case has not been followed, however, where workers
in comparable jobs had been working shorter hours for more pay and
where the reduction in hours was without consent of the employees; 33
so In re Radiant Glass Co., NWLB No. VII-D-93 (u 1-741-AR), Region VII,
IO WAR LAB. REP. I 12 (1943); In re L. B. Lockwood Co., NWLB No. 5-HO-IOI
(3100-CS-A), Region V, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 432 (1942). Contra, In re Semler Co.,
NWLB No. 3920, 12 WAR LAB. REP. 31 I (1943) affd. NWLB No. 3920-D, Region
III, IO WAR LAB. REP. 231 (1943); In re Mallory Hat Co., NWLB No. WA-309,
5 WAR LAB. REP. 3 IO ( 1943). These cases represent wage raises following a reduction
of wages prior to January 1, 1941. Of course the board will not offset wage raises
following a reduction subsequent to that date. APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL
FORMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943), § D-2(f), reprinted in I I WAR LAB REP. XXX,
XXXIII-XXXIV (1944).
31
Id. at § D-2(g), p. XXXIV.
32
In re Gimbel Brothers, Inc., NWLB Nos. II-1136, 7 WAR LAB. REP. 473
(1943). Other cases are: In re Ludwig Baumann and Co., NWLB No. 111-4466-HO
[2-HO-667], Region II, 15 WAR LAB. REP. 291 (1944); In re United CigarWhelan Stores Corp., NWLB No. 2-D-74 (1u-592-D), Region II, 9 WAR LAB.
REP. 393 (1943).
33
In re Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Co., NWLB No. 4288-D, 12 WAR LAB.
REP. 435 (1943); In re The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., NWLB No. 1114043-D, Region III, 12 WAR LAB. REP. 544 (1943); cf. In re United Cigar-Whelan
Stores Corp., NWLB No. 2-D-74 (1 I 1-592-D), Region II, 9 WAR LAB. REP. 393
(1943). Since the adoption of going wage brackets, which shall later be explained,
the reduction of working hours has resulted in upward revision of wage rates within
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f6r the· absence of employee consent might well be the cause of a labor
, dispute. And the fact that workers doing comparable work in other
·establishments are employed under more favorable conditions, indicates the possibility of workers leaving their present jobs for those
more lucrative offered elsewhere, were the board to interfere with the
cbrrection of this wage "inequality." As shall later be pointed out the
disruptive effect of labor migration is considerable and the board has
. consequently constantly sought to ward off its occurrence. Indeed, the
board's fourth cr:iterion u~der which wage increases designed to maintain differentials between workers doing dissimilar work, as between
first and second class mechanics, and to equalize wage rates of workers
doing similar work, J:iave not been offset,84 finds its basis, as shall later
be seen, in the same desire to prevent labor migration and turnover.
, :.: While the board's classification of certain increases as nonoffsettable
seems thus to represent an economically essential deviation from the
board's fundamental policies; the board has hesitated to admit any deviation at all. Its own explanation is that its failure to offset some of the
aforementioned increases is based on the principle of comparing only
!5thanges in rates paid for the same job content/' 35 In other words,
~henever a worker's productivity increases, his wages have been permitted to increase also. Such an increase, the board claims, is not inflatfonary.
But the board's explanation is inadequate for two reasons. First,
while the "same job content" principle might conceivably explain exceptions with respect to increases which depend on increased productivity, many of the other exceptions are not that easily rationalized.
For example, increased earnings due to such factors as liberalized vacation pay plans, bear no direct relation to increased productivity and
seem to represent complete disregard for the policy of combatting inflation. Second, the "same job content" principle fails to represent complete adherence to anti-inflation policy; for, while this principle in
keeping wages in line with increas;d productivity prevents increased
bracket limits. In re Denver, Colo., Market and Food Stores, NWLB Nos. l II-5572-D
(9-D-111), lII-5826-D (9-D-114), Region IX, 17 WAR LAB. REP. 283. (1944).
Note that this practice does· not merely permit an upward adjustment of wage rates
but also increases take-home pay by added amounts received for overtime. It thus
represents a double barreled deviation from anti-inflation policy.
34
In re Pittsburgh Reflector Co., NWLB No. lII-3784-HO, 16 WAR LAB. REP.
13 (1944). Contra, In re 36 New England Textile Cos., NWLB Nos. 104, 105,
123, 121, 134, 137, 153, 138, 133, 151, II6, 72, 170, 313, 2 WAR LAB. REP.
345 (1942).
85
APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FORMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943),
§ D-1(a), reprinted in II WAR LAB. REP. XXX, XXXII (1944).
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labor costs, it prevents inflation only in so far as such costs result in
advancing prices. But the assumed inflationary threat of increased consumer purchasing · power through increments in take-home wages,
where increased productivity does not result in more consumer goods is
entirely disregarded. Only in one instance is the "same job content"
principle entirely compatible with a thorough anti-inflation policy,
i.e. where increments in average hourly wage rates are due to a true
change in the composition of the labor force consisting of a substitution
of skilled workers for common labor, the skilled workers having received higher wages at their previous place of employment.86 This is
the only instance where the nation's total take-home pay is not increased
by the wage raise. The board's explanation of the many exceptions it
has carried into the Little Steel formula consequently fails to meet the
challenge of those who have chastized it for deviating too far from its
original objective. But the ectmomic factors, heretofore described,
clearly emphasize the fact that complete adherence to the letter and
fundamentals of the formula would have been impossible.87
4. The Unit of Calculation. As has earlier been pointed out the
total maladjustment allowance is determined by adding 15 per cent
of the wage level prevailing on January 1, 1941 to such wage level.
In the case of each proposed wage increase, moreover, the board must
further determine whether the wage level used as a base for measurement should be that of a single plant, a company or any other unit of
calculation. In making this determination, the board had to adopt
arbitrary and traditional standards. Thus, the board has based its calculation· on units which varied from occupational groups as small as five
foremen 88 and collective bargaining units 89 to entire plants,40 com-'
86

Indeed, if the only inflationary threat were a decrease of production per wages
paid, there would have been no necessity for anti-inflationary wage control at the beginning of the war. For labor productivity in war industry increased while unit labor
costs decreased. This man hour output in 1940 increased 8 per cent over that in 1939,
while unit labor cost decreased 3,¼ per cent. "Labor Productivity and Labor Costs
1939-41," 51 U.S. MONTHLY LAB. REv. 388-391 (1940).
87
The board has also argued that individual wage increases and others which have
not been offset have not affected many workers in the plant or company. That to
penalize the majority of employees because of wage raises received by a small number
would be unfair. Be that as it may, this argument provides no answer from antiinflation perspective.
38
In re St. Louis Public Service Co., NWLB No. 111-488-D, Region VII, 10
WAR. LAB. REP. 227 (1943); In re National Rubber Machinery Co., NWLB No.
111-846-D (V-D-95), Region V, 12 WAR LAB. REP. 513 (1943) (applied to unit
of five employees).
39
See notes 46, 47, infra.
0
~ See note 45, infra; APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FORMULA (WLB
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panies,41 employer associations 42 and industries.43 Which of these units
is chosen in a given instance is important from the viewpoint of preventing inflation. For upon request by a single plant, whose January
r 941 wage level is higher and whose offsettable increases since that
date are smaller in amount than those of the other plants in the company, the net maladjustment allowance will be greater if the single
plant rather than the entire company is chosen as the calculation unit. 44
From an anti-inflationary perspective it would seem, therefore, that
the unit, which results in a smaller increase would always be chosen by
the board. But the reported cases do not reveal the application of so
consistent an anti-inflationary policy. Nor do t4ey reveal that the
policy of preventing inflation has merely been de-emphasized in favor
of the second policy behind the Little Steel formula of preserving
labor's standard of living. The board's action simply indicates that both
Pamphlet, 1943), § E-2, reprinted in 11 WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXIV,
XXXV (1944).
41
ln re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., NWLB No. 3047-D (918), 13
WAR LAB. REP. 611 (1944); In re New York Telephone Co., NWLB No. 463,
8 WAR LAB. REP. 144 (1943); In re New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
NWLB No. III-5965-D, Region I, 16 WAR LAB. REP. 434 (1944); In re Denver
lee Cos., NWLB No. 111-5037-D (9-D-100), Region IX, 16 WAR LAB. REP. 263
(1944).
.
42
APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943), § E-4
reprinted in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXV ( 1944). Employers associations may
be considered a unit where (I) the association members and the union agree to such
application, (2) the association extends over only a single labor market locality, (3)
there is uniformity of wage rates and changes in such rates among the members, (4) all
or nearly all the employers in the industry area belong to the association. Ibid. See
for example In re New York Employing Printers Assn., Inc., NWLB No. 111-90-R,
9 WAR LAB. REP. 469 (1943).
43
In re Plymouth Rubber Co., NWLB No. IIr-2703-HO, 16 WAR LAB. REP.
546 (1944); In re Pioneer Rubber Mills, NWLB No. III-377-C, 14 WAR LAB.
REP. 745 (1944); In re Acme Rubber Manufacturing Co., NWLB No. 4197-D, 12
WAR LAB. REP. 192 (1943), and similar cases involving the rubber industry, decided
pursuant to In re United States Rubber Co., NWLB Nos. 2307-D, 190, 2862-D, 184,
8 WAR LAB. REP. 537 (1943) (applied an industry basis where plants were the
highest paying segments of the industry and average hourly rates ranged from $I.I 5
to $1.25 compared to average rates of $.70 or less in other plants of the industry).
44
See for example, In re Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co., NWLB No. 1111909-D, Region Ill, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 372 (1943); In re McQuay-Norris Mfg.
.Co., NWJ;,B No. 697 [2825-D], 9 WAR LAB. REP. 538 (1943). APPLICATION OF
THE LITTLE STEEL FORMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943), § E-2, reprinted in II WAR
LAB. REP. XXX, XXXIV, XXXV (1944). The application of the Little Steel formula on a company basis may result in a smaller increase than when applied on a bargaining unit basis. In re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., NWLB No. 3047-D
(918), 13 WAR LAB. REP. 6II (1944).
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of the above considerations have yielded to considerations of administrative expediency, and fear of the consequences of disrupting established wage institutions, has also been a powerful determining factor.
Thus, the board has generally chosen calculation units on the basis of
established collective bargaining relationships of groups of employees
with the employer, or other traditional wage rate relationships of
industry. The usual unit has, therefore, been the plant-since it most
frequently constitutes the established wage pattern center.45 Where a
collective bargaining unit smaller than a plant, or a company consisting
of many plants satisfied the above requirement, it has been chosen as
the calculation unit. 46 For example, where the employees of a group
of department stores were represented by several unions, some of which
bargained for employees of only some stores, while the other unions
represented workers in all the establishments, the Little Steel formula
was applied on the basis of the individual bargaining unit! 7 In other
instances, the calculation unit has been chosen because the workers
within it were not touched by important changes that·a:ffected workers
who could have been included in a larger unit. This also serves to
simplify calculation of the net allowance. Thus the net allowance has
45

APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943), § E,
reprinted in II WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXIV (1944). Cf. In re Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., II WAR LAB. REP. 592 (1944).
46
In re Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., NWLB No. I I 1-4732-D
(9-D-98), 'Region IX, 15 WAR LAB. REP. 696 (1944), affirmed NWLB No. 1114732-D, 19 WAR LAB. REP. 459 (1944); In re Dredge Owners Assn., NWLB No.
111-1018-D, Region XI, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 399 (1944), reaffirming 9 WAR L>B.
REP. 630 (1943). See note 47, infra. A unit smaller than a plant whether unionized
or not must have been recognized by the employer in previous wage dealings. APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943), §§ E(r), (8), reprinted in II WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXIV, XXXV (1944). Compare discussion p. 1022, infra.
·
"If application of the Little Steel formula is to be on a company-wide basis as
distinguished from a plant basis it should usually be made for plants under one ownership in the same community or area. This should be permitted if there is such a closeknit wage relationship among the plants that for the sake of stable labor relations the
adjustment should be [so] based ...." APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943), § E (3), reprinted in II WAR LAB. REP. XXX at
XXXV (1944). Cf. In re Denver Ice Cos., NWLB No. 111-5037-D (9-D-100),
Region IX, 16 WAR LAB. REP. 263 (1944).
47
In re Five Pittsburgh Department Stores, NWLB No. 699 (2827-D), 9 WAR
LAB. REP. 204 1943). Compare In re Denver Ice Cos., NWLB No. III-5037-D
(9-D-100) Region IX, 16 WAR LAB. REP. 263 (1944). See also In re Dredge
Owners' Assn., NWLB No. I I 1-1018-D, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 480 (1944) (group
represented by different unions treated as single unit, since unions have customarily,
negotiated a joint contract with equal wage increases provided for all employees).
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been calculated on the basis of an occupational group which had remained unaffected by plant expansion.48 Still another factor in choosing
the calculation unit has once again been the board's attempt to maintain
established job classification differentials or to equalize differentials
which are not usually part of the wage pattern, in order to prevent
labor migration and turnover. Thus where application of the formula
on a collective bargaining unit basis, especially in the case of craft workers, would have caused a disruption of existing inter-occupational diffe.rentials within a plant, a company-wide unit has been employed.49
The various considerations that influence the board in choosing the
proper unit of calculation are best illustrated by a comparison of the
Pacific Telegraph& Telephone Company case 50 with the Mountain
States Telegraph & Telephone Company case. 51 In the former case
application of the Little Steel formula to the particular bargaining
unit for which an increase was sought, would have benefited that bargaining unit above other employees of the telephone system. Moreover, the company had made wartime increases on a c9mpany-wide
basis. 52 On the other hand the Mountain States C9mpany had maintained an unbroken record of wage adjustments on a bargaining unit
basis, and application on a bargaining unit basis would not put these
employees ahead of others. In the Pacific case the formula was applied
on a company wide basis and in the Mountain case the formula was
applied on a bargaining unit basis, though in both cases the smaller
increase would have resulted from a company wide application. The
board's anti-inflation policy would, thus, have been served to a greater
extent by applying the formula on a company wide basis in the Moun48
In re Robaczynski Machine Corp., NWLB No. 2692-D, 8 WAR LAB. REP.
304 (1943).
,
,
49
ln re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., NWLB No. 3047-D (918), 13
WAR LAB. REP. 611 (1944). The same holds true where the result of applying the
rule to departments would be un~tabilizing. In re New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., NWLB No. 111-5965-D, Region I, 16 WAR LAB. REP. 434 (1944).
50
In re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., NWLB No. 2692-D, 13 WAR LAB.
REP. 611 (1944).
51
In re Mountain States Telegraph & Telephone Co., NWLB No. I 11-4732-D,
19 WAR LAB. REP. 459 (1944).
52
But cf. dissenting opinion, NWLB No. 3047-D (918), 13 WAR LAB. REP.
611 at 617, 626 (1944). In re National Assn. of Manufacturers of Pressed and
Blown Glassware, NWLB No. 111-4919-D, 18 WAR LAB. REP. 53 (1944). It is
apparently not important that the bargaining'is done· separately, or else the bargaining
unit would be the usual unit of calculation. The important consideration is how wide
a group of workers ~id the final wage agreement in past practice cover. Where industry-wide agreements have been usual, an industry-wide calculation unit will be used.
Id. at 59.
.
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tain case, as well. But since both the prior wage practice, and consid~.ation of the possibility of creating "inequalities," pointed to a bargaining
unit application, this was finally directed.
::r
One cannot escape the final conclusion, therefore, that in deternn.in:ing the unit of calculation, the board has again deviated from the ba~c
policies behind the Little Steel formula. 58 And this again seems .to
have been almost inevitable and determined by more impor®nt
economic and administrative factors. To complete this picture of step-1by
step divergence from original objectives it remains to examine b~J;-,a
single further phase of the formula's application.
;,-:,
5. Distribution of the Allowance. Once the net maladjustment
allowance is determined, it has to be distributed in the form of1 a,n
increase in money wages to particular workers. From the point of view
of preserving labor's standard of living it would seem that the increase
should be so distributed that worker~ who had received larger increati.es ·
since January r 7 r94r, thus meeting increased living costs to a greater
extent, would receive a smaller share of the net allowance than those
who had received lesser increases. The board, however, has once a~in
refrained from following a fixed policy and has favored any distribution agreed to by both labor and manageme.nt which did not needles.s-ly
disturb the existing wage pattern.
Determination of the distribution of the net maladjustment allowance has, therefore, frequently been relegated to employer-empfoy~e
negotiations. 5 " As a result of such negotiations the net allowance +has
been applied not only to wages of the individual workers themselves,
but also so as to effect a fiat or percentage increase in piece 55 or hOTir-ly
rates to workers in one or more job classifications. 56 Where these Nave
"')'

58

This deviation is by no means complete--;--anti-infiation policy still see~!l~terminative in many cases. In re Denver Ice Cos., NWLB No. I I 1-5037-D (9-D100 ), Region IX, 16 WAR LAB. REP. 263 (1944) (six ice and creamery comf!ft~i'es
which had been bargaining with one union not considered a unit. Result: emp1Qj'ees
of only two plants are awarded increases); In re New England Telephone & ·Telegraph Co., NWLB No. 111-5965-D, Region I, 16 WAR LAB. REP. 434 (1944}"(all
departments combined into a unit despite fact that the union had bargained for employees in one department. Result: 3_½ cents granted instead of 9 cents permi~ble
under department application).
·r , .
54
See note 58, infra.
·''"
55
In re Hiram Swank's Sons, NWLB No. AR-229, IO WAR LAB. REP'.·· 280
(1943); In re Eagle Ottawa Leather Co., NWLB No. 3179-A (AR-127), 10~,W.~R
LAB. REP. 163 (1943). APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FORMULA (~B
Pamphlet, 1943), § F-4, reprinted in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXVI (11944).
56
)n re Chrysler Corp., NWLB No. 199, 7 WAR LAB. REP. 208 (1943);,J~ire
Monolith Portland Cement Co., NWLB No. 244,_ 4 WAR LAB. REP. 343 (r942).
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been classifications of tate range jobs the allowance has been applied to
the starting rates, the minimum rates or the maximum rates. 57 Determination of issues arising from these variables, such as, whether the
distribution should be on a flat or percentage basis, or what, workers
should receive the larger portion of the increase, should, according
to the board, be made in such a way as to effect a final distribution
that tends to eliminate deviational and preserve institutional wage differentials. 58 With the establishment of the board's sound and tested
wage brackets, subsequently discussed, the board has required that the
distribution result in a wage pattern in keeping with such brackets.59
Both this requirement based on a policy of preserving existing wage
patterns, as well as the tendency to relegate determination of distribution issues to negotiation, in order to avoid unnecessary labor disputes,
seems to have encroached on the formula's original purpose of pre. serving labor's standard of living. It might be contended, that where a
deviational differential had been brought about by wage increments
to particular workers subsequent to January r, 1941, a distribution designed to eliminate such differential would also tend to give a greater
portion of the allowance to those employees who have received lesser
increases in the past, and that, therefore, there is no contradiction between preserving labor's standard of living, on the one hand,- and upholding institutional wage patterns on the other. The contradiction
between these two policies is apparent, however, where the deviational
differential had arisen prior to January r, 1941, and there remains, conAPPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943), § F-5, reprinted in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXVI (1944).
But the board prohibits distribution of the increase in accordance with varying
lengths of service. APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA, (WLB Pamphlet,
1943), § F-3, reprinted in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXV (1944). Nor may
varying amounts of weekly take-home wages be compensated for by uneven distribution.
Where the straight-time rate is the same the increase has to Be the same. Id. at § F-2,
p. XXXV.
57
APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943),
§ F-5, reprinted in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXVI (1944).
58
APPLICATION OF THE LITTLE STEEL FoRMULA (WLB Pamphlet, 1943),
§ F-1, reprinted in I I WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXXV (1944). The board frequently asks the parties to negotiate the distribution within certain limits. In re
General Steel Castings Corp., NWLB No. 524, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 2 25 ( I 94 3) ; In re
Weatherhead Co., NWLB No. 217, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 184 (1943); In re Western
Union Telegraph Co., NWLB No. 388, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 133 (1943); In re Fulton County Tanners Negotiating Committee, NWLB No. 83, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 87
( I 942). In order to achieve equalization the method of tapering increases so that a
larger portion of the increase is paid lower paid employees is frequently used. See pp.
1036, infra.
59
See pp. 1035-1039, infra.

1 945]

W.L.B. WAGE STABILIZATION

ro25

sequently, no cost of living basis for granting lower paid workers a
larger portion of the increase. Moreover, the board has ruled that it is
undesirable to compensate for varying amounts of take-home pay, due to
such factors as variations in the number of hours worked by different
employees, by an uneven distribution of the net allowance. 60 Equalization
of take-home pay would frequently be most desirable from the point of
view of preserving labor's standard of living. For, as earlier indicated,
the relation of earnings to the cost of living serves as the only actual
measurement of a loss in living standards. From the point of view of
preserving institutional wage patterns, on the other hand, distribution
designed to equalize earnings would be undesirable, since it would disturb existing wage rate differentiafa. The contradiction between the
policies of preserving labor's standard of living and maintaining institutional wage patterns with respect to distributing the net allowance
is thus apparent. But despite this contradiction, the board has once
again attached greater weight to the latter policy.
6. Conclusion. While the Little Steel formula constituted an exception to the maintenance of wages at September r 5, r 942 levels, its
original intention was to limit this exception to those increases necessary
to maintain labor's standard of living. Thus it was to fulfill two functions; to bring wages up to the cost of living, and to prevent inflationary increases beyond that point. In its application, however, both
of these functions have been limited by factors of administrative
expediency and elements of a wartime wage economy. This has created
a situation where some workers' standard of living is preserved and
that of others is impaired, and where wages of some workers are limited
so as not to become inflationary and those of others are not. Moreover,
it can not be said that on the whole the formula has served to prevent
inflation. On the other hand it cannot be denied that other elements in
a wage economy could not be ignored. Some of these factors, as will
be seen, are so important that they constitute exceptions to September
r 5, r 942 wage freezing, beyond their effect on the operation of the
Little Steel formula. As such they have made wage stabilization even
less effective as a means of inflation control than is already apparent
to the reader.
B. Inequalities
As has already been pointed out, one factor of the wage economy
that has caused the board to de-emphasize anti-inflationary policy
consisted of the need for maintaining sound differentials between wages
60

APPLICATION

§ F-2, reprinted in

(WLB Pamphlet, 1943),
XXX at XXXV.
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paid to · employees performing different work and for diminishing
undue differentials between wages paid to those doing like work. It
is obvious that if a first class mechanic who has usually received, feels
entitled to, or could receive wages equal to those paid first class mechanics in neighboring'plants producing similar articles were suddenly
to find himself receiving a smaller wage by comparison, he would seek
work in the neighboring plant and in a period of wartime scarcity
would probably find it easy to shift his employment. A group of workers doi~g t!J.e same might easily cause serious disruption of production;
and if shift of employment cannot be easily accomplished, low morale
and mass quitting of jobs is another likely consequence. It is important,
therefore, to equalize wages of workers doing substantially similar
work as far as possible. Similarly, the fir~t class mechanic who has
received or should receive 20 cents more than the second class
mechanic in his or other plants, will not welcome a mere I 0 cent differential in wages caused by an increase in the second class mechanic's
wage only. Consequently, the maintenance of proper differentials between wages paid workers whose jobs are differently classified is an
important economic caveat in any wage stabilization program.
As a result, the board, since its inception, has, in applying the second specific exception to the September I5 wage stabilization ot'der,61
granted general increases to maintain wage rate relationships. These
increases became known as those necessary to correct "inequalities."
Although these increases are now restricted because of their tendency
to become unduly inflationary,62 a study of the history of the development of the board's "inequalities" criterion reveals that in substance
the basic policy still obtains.
I. Development Before April z943. At first, the board granted
increases to correct undue or inadequate differentials between workers
within a plant, and raised the wage level of underpaid employees to
.the average or maximum rates paid wage earners for comparable jobs
within the same area, industry, or neighboring plants and related industries. 63 Since average or maximum wages in
area might turn out
0

an

61

E~ecutive Order No. 9250, 7 FED. REG. 7871 (1942). Seep. 1008, supra.
:_See p. 1028, infra.
63 See cases collected in Sheffield, "Wartime Wage Control," I I GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 399 at 416,417, notes 42, 43, 44 and 45 (1943). The board has also followed
a policy of equalizing sex, age and race differentials-this apparently is somewhat of
an exception to its policy, hereafter discussed, of non-interference with "historical"
differentials. See "WLB: Wage Adjustments in Reclassification Cases," 18 WAR LAB.
REP. XII at XIII ( 1944). But where it is both impossible and inadvisable for female
employees to undertake heavy physical labor which has been established as part of cer6
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to be higher or lower than those in an industry, for example, the inequalities increases permitted varied with the choice of comparable
units. Though the board might have seized this opportunity to introduce an anti-inflationary policy to some extent into the administration
of inequalities increases, by always selecting units offering lower average
or maximum wage rates, this was not done. The inequalities principle
alone prevailed and the policy generally followed was one of disallowing equalization on the basis of larger units only where the resulting
adjustments would cause inequalities within smaller units. 64 So far as
it went this policy was sound, since labor turnover and migration is
more likely to result from comparatively higher wages offered within
an area rather than those offered by industry at distant plants.
But this policy did not go far enough, for the prevention of labor
migration is not the only reason for the maintenance of a sound wage
structure. Absence of a rationalized wage pattern creates low employee
morale and means a lack of incentive to employees such as would spur
them on to train themselves for or try to perform jobs requiring
greater skill. However, despite the frequent presence in established
wage structures of inconsistencies and wage differentials seemingly
unrelated to quality and quantity of work, the board was, except for
some instances of intra-plant inequalities later discussed, content to
eliminate differentials resulting from deviations from established wage
structures 65 and to maintain wage rate differences established in the
past. Thus the board refrained from correcting the north-south differtain jobs when performed by men and where as a consequence the employment of
women workers may entail extra supervision, extra set-up men, or extra carry-off men
extra labor costs can be computed and can be given pro rata weight in establishing an
equitable rate of pay for the female worker.
6
* See for example: In re Five St. Louis, Mo. Refractories Cos., NWLB No. 348
(2476-CS-D), 7 WAR LAB. REP. I (1943); In re Reynolds Metals Alloys Co., Inc.,
NWLB No. 796, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 370 (1943); In re J. I. Case Co., NWLB No.
130, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 60 (1943); In re Shell Oil Co., NWLB No. 5u, 6 WAR
LAB. REP. 45 (1943); In re American Enka Corp., NWLB No. 182, 6 WA"R LAB.
REP. 343 (1943); In re Tennessee Products Corp., NWLB No. 329, 5 WAR
LAB. REP. 91 (1942); In re Ford Motor Co., NWLB No. 234, 4 WAR LAB. REP.
59 (1942); In re Non-Ferrous Metal Cos., NWLB Nos. 185, 218, 228, 237, 275,
276, 341, 344, 345, 346, 347, 390, 393, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 147 (1943); In re Mack
Mfg. Corp., NWLB No. 76, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 87 (1942); In re Associated Milk
Dealers, Inc., NWLB No. 271, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 183 (1942).
65
See qualification of this statement on p. 1033, infra. But it was in line with the
policy stated in the text that the board frequently granted wage adjustment to maintain
customary differentials between industries. In re Hubbard & Co., NWLB No. 2794-D,
7 WAR LAB. REP. 444 (1943); In re Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., NWLB No.
266-A, 266-B, 266-C, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 279 (1942); In re Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., NWLB No. 145, 3 WAR LAE. REP. 274 (1942).
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ential 66 present in many industries and other "historically justified"
industry-wide wage rate discrepancies. 07 If there is any justification for
this policy it lies in the administrative difficulties involved in reforming
widespread and well established wage patterns, and the inflationary
threat of the many increases that would as a consequence have to be
approved.
2. Development since April I943· This last mentioned threat
proved formidable, however, even despite the fact that the board had
thus limited its objective. Inequalities increases had become a favorite
.yay of getting around the restrictions· still remaining in the Little
Steel formula. Between October 3, 1942, and March 19, r943, 62 per
cent of the increases permitted by the board were ostensibly for the
purpose of eliminating inequalities. 68 Consequently, in the "Big Four"
Meat Packing cases 69 th~ board further limited the application of the
66

ln re Aluminum Co. of America, NWLB No. 66, l WAR LAB. REP. 7 (1942).
" .... elimination of the wage differential involved in this case would have an undesirable disrupting effect at this time on the general economy of the areas in which the
plants in question are located .... [and] is bound to produce repercussions and negative effects on industrial expansion programs, competition for labor and the continued
operations of some industrial concerns. It is obvious that such effects should be a\'Oided
during the war period because they are not in the best interests of aiding the presentation of our war program." Id. at 13. In re Reynolds Metals Co., NWLB No. 193,
2 WAR LAB. REP. 496 (1942); In re Thirty-six New England Textile Cos., NWLB
Nos. 104, 105, 123, 121, 134, 137, 153, 138, 133, 151, II6, 72, 170, 313, 2
WAR LAB. REP. 345 (1942); In re New England Textile Operators, NWLB No.
147, 2 WAR LAB. REP. 102 (1942).
67
In re Five St. Louis, Mo. Refractories Cos., NWLB No. 348 (2476-CS-D),
7 WAR LAB. REP. l (1943); In re Phoenix Iron Co., NWLB No. WA-177, 6 WAR
LAB. REP. 220 (1943); In re Detroit Maintenance Employees, NWLB Nos. 125,
126, 234, 240, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 220 (1942); In re Harbison-Walker Refractories
Co., NWLB No. WA-404, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 561 (1942). Conversely increments
were granted not merely to correct inequalities but also to maintain established differentials. In re Lane Cotton Mills Co., NWLB No. 638, 7 WAR LAB. REP. 28 l
(1934). See also S. Hearings on S. J. Res. 161, 77th Cong. 2nd sess. (1942) 104
(Committee on Banking and Currency). See note 65 supra.
68
"Out of a total of 8,971 wage increases granted by regional War Labor Boards
between October 3, 1942 and March 19, 1943, 5,572, or 62 per cent were granted
for the purpose of eliminating or reducing inequalities; 20 per cent were granted as
cost-of-living adjustments; and less than l per cent were granted to eliminate substandards of living; other increases were based on a combination of these factors."
Sheffield, "Wartime Wage Control," l l GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 399 at 423, n. 67
(1943). How great a loophole these increases constituted is perhaps indicated by the
fact that they amounted on one occasion to an increase of 71 per cent over Jan. 1,
1941 wages. In re The Endicott Forging & Mfg. Corp., NWLB No. 334, 4.WAR
LAB. REP. 392 (1942).
69
In re "Big Four" Meat Packing Cos., NWLB Nos. 186, 181, 189, 188, 245,
187, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 395 (1943). See also In re Boeing Aircraft Co., NWLB Nos.
174, 307, 557, 558, 608, 609, 610, 673, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 581 (1943); In re
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inequalities principle by indicating that it would no longer grant increases to eliminate differentials in wage rates between industries. And
finally, in April 1943, the President issued his "Hold-the-Line
Order," 70 whereby he attempted to stem the inflationary trend prevailing in the country by, among other things, removing the board's
power to grant inequalities increases.71
Though this was expected to help hold back inflation, the ensuing
threat of labor migration was quickly realized and the chairman of
the War Man Power Commission was consequently authorized to bar
the transfer of any employee f.rom one job to another paying a wage
higher than that formerly received. 12 But this was insufficient. First,
job freezing without concomitant wage equalization had proved ineffective in the past. Thus, in the case of the copper, lead and zinc workers in Idaho and Utah, governmental job freezing orders failed to
halt a migration to higher paid jobs that had in the first nine months
of I 942 drained 20 per cent of the working force available in those
states. Only after the board had granted a one-dollar-a-day increase
to over ten thousand workers and established a Non-Ferrous Metal
Stabilization Panel was this exodus successfully halted. 78 Second, employee morale and incentive is not maintained by any job freezing
order. At least, established differentials must not be disrupted. But
this is a difficult task without the power to grant inequalities increases.
For established differentials were especially vulnerable because increases under the Little Steel formula would frequently result in
higher wages to wage earners in a lower job classification without correlative increases to those in a higher job classification. Moreover, the
Little Steel formula proved generally difficult in this connection, as
may be illustrated by the United Atlas Cement case 74 which reached
the board shortly after the "Hold-the-Line Order." The board had
previously awarded a wage increase of 5,½ cents an hour to employees
in some of the plants of a company that had in the past applied a uniReynolds Metals Co., NWLB No. 796, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 370 (1943) {refusal to
equalize rates of company with those paid by a nearby government-operated plant).
70
8 FED. REG. 4681 (1943).
71
Id. at § 2. The board is directed "to authorize no further increase in wages or
salaries except such as are clearly necessary to correct substandards of living . . . [ o:
are] ... in accordance with the Little. Steel Formula ... for the rise in the cost of
living."
72
See 6 W.H. REP. 389 (1943).
78
In re Non-Ferrous Metal Cos., NWLB Nos. 185, 218, 228, 237, 275, 276,
341, 344, 345, 346, 347, 390, 393, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 147 (1942).
74
In re Universal Atlas Cement Co., NWLB No. 2931-CS-D, 7 WAR LAB, REP.
474 (1943).
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form wage policy. But under the Little Steel formula the board could
only grant an increase of 2 cents to employees in the plant involved.
The company's uniform wage policy was thus endangered. Had the
board remained powerless to grant inequalities increases a similar problem would have arisen in some I 7,ooo pending cases.
Consequently, on the board's unaqimous request 75 and by virtue
of the delegation of the President's wage- stabilizing powers to him in
the "Hold-the-Line Order," the Director of Economic Stabilization
on May I2 7 r943, restored some of the board's powers to correct inequalities. This directive 76 authorized the establishment of wage brackets of "sound and tested rates" by occupational groups per industry
per labor market area which permitted changes to be made in other
rates only up to the minimum of such brackets,11 except -in "rare and
unusual" cases.78 In connection with increases, resulting in intra-plant
inequalities, which might have been granted to underpaid occupational
groups because of the Little Steel formula or because, as shall later be
seen, their wages were substandard, or as related to the adoption of a
longer workweek, correlative increases could be approved in immediately interrelated job classifications in order to preserve the minimum
differentials necessary for the .maintenance of productive efficiency. 79
3. Intra-Area Inequalities. Under this newly established system of
maintaining a sound wage structure undue differentials within an area
were mitigated by permitting wage rates below the minimum of an
established bracket of "sound and tested" rates to be increased up to
such :minimum. An understanding and evaluation of this new ''inequalities" doctrine depends therefore on some description of how these
wage brackets were or could have been established. '
The herculean administrative task of determining· rate brackets,
or rate ranges from minimum to maximum of stable, tested rates for
given occupation per industry per labor market area, fell on the Re75

Sheffield, "Wartime Wage Control," II GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 399 at 425.
Policy Directive by the Director of Economic Stabilization, May 12, 1943,
reprinted in 8 WAR LAB. REP. XIV (1943), hereinafter cited as Policy Directive,
May 12, 1943. Pursuant to this directive the National War Labor Board issued detailed instructions to the regional boards. Instructions to Regional War Labor Boards;
Operations under Executive Order 9328 and Under the Supplementary Directive of
May 12, 1943, issued June 8, 1943, amended July 7, 1943, reprinted in 8 WAR LAB.
REP. XXII (1943), hereinafter cited as Instructions, Executive Order 9328 (1943).
77
Policy Directive, May 12, 1943, § 1, reprinted in 8 WAR LAB. REP. XV at
XVI; Instructions, Executive Order 9328, § 13(1), reprinted in 8 WAR LAB. REP.
XXII, XXIV (1943).
78
See pp. 1039-1041, infra. ·
19
See pp. 1035, 1043, infra.
76
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gional War Labor Boards. Fjrst, rate data had to l;)e collected and
classified with the aid of trade association surveys, union agreements,
files of minor research agencies, special surveys of particular com- ·
panies, regional wage data files and studies by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.80 • Secondly, such data had to be translated into brackets. This
required first, the determination of comparable job classifications,; second, the determination of labor market areas; and finally, the establishment of minimum wage rates 81 or wage rate ranges. 82
As to defining comparable occupations, this couid only be done
according to job descriptions of which those of the United States Employment Service and United States Department of Labor were the
most frequently used. 88 In determining comparable occupations such
elements, regularly used for purposes of job analysis, as the type of
industry and the method of wage payment 8 " and the additional element of the degree of unironization,85 assumed importance. This latter
80

Instructions, Executive Order 9328, § 1-A (1943), reprinted in 8 WAR LAB.
REP. XXII ( 1943). This work was to be done by a tripartite division organized within
each regional board with the assistance of regional wage stabilization divisions and the
National Board's wage stabilization division, which had previously been established.
Ibid.
81
Id. at § II-B, p. XXIII. See also Resolution on the San Francisco and Los
Angeles Brackets for Clerical and Office Employees, NWLB Press Release B-1661
(1944).
82
The national board's instructions read: "In localities where each establishment
pays ranges of rates rather than single rates for a given job classification, the minimum
of each plant's rate range rather than the average or maximum rate should be utilized
to determine the minimum of the wage bracket ..• where some establishments pay
a single rate and other establishments pay a range of rates, the minimum rate of the
wage bracket may be set either at the first substantial and representative cluster of the
minimum rates of the ranges or at the first substantial and representative cluster of the
single rates. In setting the bracket minimum for a given job on the basis of single rates,
the regional boards may consider the weighted averages of the rates for the job by the
respective rate-range companies as the equivalents of single rates. Instructions, Executive Order 9328, §§ ll-B-2~C(2), (3), reprinted in 8 WAR LAB. REP. XXII at XXIV
(1943). The weighted average is normally the midpoint of the rate range. Id. at
§ III-B-3(a), p. XXV; Statement of Policy, Going Wage Rates of Region VIII
(Dallas), MANUAL OF GOING WAGE RATES 233, § 3 (1944). Some Regional Boards
have established two sets of rate brackets in order to meet this problem. See for example, Going Wage Rate of Region II (New York), 13 WAR LAB. REP. 847 (1944).
88
See for example, Going Wage Rates of Region IX (Denver), MANUAL OF
GoING WAGE RATES 423 (1944); Going Wage Rates for Region VIII (Dallas), id.
at 233.
84
BALDERSTON, WAGE SETTING BASED oN JoB ANALYSIS AND EvALUATION 5,
38-43 (1940).
85
Instructions, Executive Order 9328, § II-B-x(b) (1943), reprinted in 8 WAR
LAB. REP. XXII (1943). As to how incentive methods of wage payment are sometimes
dealt with even though the going wage rates are set as hourly rates, see Opinion of

1032

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43

element can probably be explained by the fact that the bargaining
power of unions need be reckoned with from the point of view of expedient handling of the labor market; though from the point of view
of preserving morale and incentive and preventing labor migration
the degree of unionization should probably make no di:ff erence.
As to the use of labor market areas, the national board recommended that the regional boards consider a single locality the usual labor
market area, but indicated that there was no hard and fast rule with
respect to geographical and industrial coverages. Closely contiguous
and related localities, scattered plants over several areas, or entire
regions might be considered appropriate labor market areas for job
classifications-in certain industries.86 This, of course, originally gave the
regional boards a great deal of latitude. 87 And there existed the legal
possibility for the return of the full inequalities criterion which both
the President and the national board had considered inflationary. As
a consequence, the national board, on April I 5, I 944, in the North
American Aviation case, 88 announced the principle, which now generthe Board on Cleveland Foundry Rates, 13 WAR LAB. REP. (Advance Sheets, Feb. 9,
1944) W-69, W-71. See also note 94 infra. As to how the degree of unionization
and the strength of the union probably influenced the board in setting higher than
normal going wage rates, see id. at W-72, 73. Since the type of industry is an element
in bracket determination government rates have not been used in determining brackets.
In re Loew's, lnc., NWLB No. II-3354, I I WAR LAB. REP. 768 (1944).
86
lnstructions, Executive Order 9328, '1I-B-4-c (1943), reprinted in 8 WAR
LAB. REP. XXII at XXIII (1943). In re Southeastern Area Employers Negotiating
Committee, NWLB No. 3372-A, 12 WAR LAB. REP. 666 (1943) (Determination
on industry-wide basis in case involving over-the-roa£l truckers); In re Pound Brothers
Lumber Co., NWLB No. I-II-4330-HO (9-D-93), Region IX, 13 WAR LAB. REP.
561 (1944) (Adjacent area rates used in lumber industry); In re Bell Aircraft Corp.,
NWLB No. 1-7286, Region I, II WAR LAB. REP, 143 (1943) (Entire State considered as labor market area); In re Central Maine Power Co., NWLB Press Release
No. B-1635 (1944); In re Portland Traction Co., NWLB No. I II-1643-D, 13 WAR
LAB. REP. I 3 8 ( I 944); Director of Economic Stabilization, Transit Directive, issued
April 14; 1944 (adjacent city rates used in transit industry). See also In re American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., NWLB-No. 111-7526-D, 8 W. H. REP. 231 (1945).
In re Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., NWLB No. I l 1-1 I 143-D, 8 W. H.
REP. 231 (1945); In re New York Telephone Co., NWLB No. I II-7204-D, 8
w. H. REP. 232 (1945).
87 See In re Brockton Gas Light Co., NWLB No. 111-7568-D, Region I, 17
WAR LAB. REP. 649 (1944); In re American Barge Lines, NWLB Nos. I I 1-3366-D,
III-3546-HO, IIl-2674-D, III-3964-HO, 15 WAR LAB. REP. 540 (1944); In re
Barium Products, Ltd., NWLB No. 111-858-D (10-D-78), Region X, 14 WAR LAB.
REP. 67 (1944); In re Texas Star Flour Mills, NWLB No. 8-10581, Region VIII,
14 WAR LAB. REP. 65 (1944).
88 In re North American Aviation, Inc., NWLB No. 8-8102, 15 WAR. LAB.
REP. 322 (1944).
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ally governs, that company-wide uniformity of wage rates must give
way to area wage stabilization. 89 This has the disadvantage that resulting differentials within companies or industries might still cause
both labor migration and low employee morale. 00 Moreover, it is still
not clear that the selection of labor market areas in general has been
geared to the major objective of intra-area comparison, i.e. the prevention of labor migration, for there seems little indication that labor
market areas designated by the regional boards have been determined
on the basis of labor migration studies. This is important because choosing areas arbitrarily amounts to establishing an arbitrary standard for
granting inflationary wage increases without accomplishing the sound
objective, the stoppage of labor migration.
The final step in establishing wage brackets, as earlier indicated,
was the determination of bracket minima and maxima. These were at
first not easy to determine. The board, consequently, suggested a
"rule of thumb" method whereby rates IO per cent below and above
the average were fixed as tentative bracket minima and maxima respectively.91
Wage brackets, as they were established by the regional boards, are
of course subject to the objection stated with respect to the earlier "inequalities" doctrine. Differentials between brackets are based on statistics of established wage rates which have not generally been tested
89
This was the rule usually followed by the regional board. See, for exa11_1ple:
In re Rock, Land & Gravel Producers, NWLB No. III-5353-HO, 16 WAR LAB.
REP. 182 (1944); In re American Can Co., NWLB No. 3266-A, 15 WAR LAB. REP.
450 (1944); In re Ken-Rad Tube & ~amp Corp., NWLB No. 2942-D (815), 14
WAR LAB. REP. 557 ( I 944) ; In re Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc., NWLB No. 11 12228-HO, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 553 (1944); In re Puget Sound Salmon Canners Inc.,
NWLB No. 111-2440-D, III-2474-D, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 542 (1944); In re Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., NWLB No. 3406-A, 12 WAR LAB. REP. I IO (1943); In re
Universal Atlas Cement Co., NWLB No.2939-D, II WAR LAB. REP. 21 (1943);
In re Armstrong Cork Co., NWLB No. 2689-D (561), IO WAR LAB. REP. 301'
(1943); In re Associated Laundries, Inc., NWLB No. 12-329, 9 WAR LAB. REP.
147 (1943); In re Mead Corp., NWLB No. 308 (2436-D), 8 WAR LAB. REP. 471
(1943).
90
See for example: In re Alaska-Juneau Gold-Mining Co., NWLB No. 1112432-D, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 442 (1944), affirming 12 WAR LAB. REP. 694 (1943);
In re Shirt Institute Inc., NWLB Nos. 111-1641-D, 111-1862-D, 111-1546-D, 13
WAR LAB. REP. 81 (1943). President Murray of the C.I.O. has stated that the
bracket system as now constituted impairs employee efficiency, because among other
things it is based on local factors which tend to break down national wage rate patterns established on an industry-wide basis through collective bargaining. See "WLB
Wage Policy under CIO Fire," 6 W. H. REP. 1081 (1943).
91
lnstructions, Executive Order 9328, § II-B-2-b (1943), reprinted in 8 WAR
LAB. REP. XII, XXIII (1943).
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by any method of job evaluation. Job evaluation would grade }obs
according to such factors as mental effort, skill, physical effort, responsibility, education, and working conditions. The final wage curve would
then distribute the money available for wages according to such a
gradation. No such method was followed, however, and the wage
brackets were usually arrived at on the basis of mere statistics of established rates." (Of course in some cases, as shall later be seen, the board
has ordered the revamping of wage structures, etc. But even this revamping is controlled by brackets which have not been arrived at after '
a general revamping or testii:ig of the soundness of rate structures in
the area.) The resulting ·differential to which the wage structure in
an area is now geared may therefore be said to be of doubtful value
from the point of view of preserving employee morale and incentive.
Another difficulty arises because wage brackets tend to become
obsolete and then fail to meet the requirements of the particular market
at a particular time. 92 Since no more than 25 per cent of newly hired
workers may be paid more than bracket minimum wages, this creates
difficulties for personnel directors-. Moreover, government employees
are exempt from the wage brackets and their wages are not included
in determining such brackets. It happens, therefore, that the government can compete favorably with private industry for the available
manpower .r,s
Further, it should be noted that in establishing tentative minima
an arbitrary IO per cent below average wage level was chosen. Moreover, whether tentative or permanent the wage level to which all
wages may be adjusted is under the bracket system below the average
wage level in the area. This should be contrasted with the board's preApril policy of raising rates up to the average or maxima in the area.
The bracket system: as it now stands does not prevent migration of
laborers from establishments paying minimum rates to those paying
maximum rates. This objection should be noted, despite the doubtful
possible contention in support of the bracket system, that since mini..:
mum brackets represent wages paid by some concerns in this area,
which have not suffered labor migration and turnover, adjustment up
to those rates should be sufficient to prevent such migration and turnover.
92

The War Labor Board has instructed its regional boards that wage brackets
may not be revised on the basis of wage data reflecting currently paid wage rates. It
revised at all it must be to reflect rates in effect as of April, 1943. 8 W. H. REP, 52
(1945).
,
93
See 8 W. H. REP. 5 at 8 (1945).
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Finally, the bracket system, just like the Little Steel formula, is
based primarily on wage rates and such factors as bonuses 94 are not
considered. Unless the granting of bonuses becomes r~gulated to a
greater extent than, as shall hereafter be pointed out, is now the practice this exemption may prove undesirable even from the point of view
of the policy behind the inequalities doctrine. For it is obvious that
though wage rates for comparable work in an area may be equal, the
ultimate wage will not be because of the addition of, for example, a
Christmas bonus, or rotating shift differential. 95
4. Intra-Plant Inequalities. Although the bracket system thus to
a large extent restored the board's pre-April powers with respect to
inter-area "inequalities," it failed to do so with respect to intra-plant
"inequalities." For it became difficult to maintain established differentials between job classifications in those situations where an increase
was granted up to the minimum bracket to workers in a job classification immediately below another classification whose rates are already
above the minimum of its applicable bracket. Strictly speaking, under
a bracket system, the higher classification rate should not be increased
to maintain the differential between it and the lower rate. The same
has been true in cases where the lower rat6 was increased because of the
Little Steel formula, or because, as shall later be indicated, lower
bracket wages were substandard.1) 6 To avert this difficulty the regional
boards have sometimes granted general increases to workers in all
job classifications by as much as the amount of the lower classification increase,97 despite the fact that such general increases violated the
bracket principle. The national board has repeatedly warned, however,
that above-minima increments must be tapered so as to preserve, not
94
See "Clarification of Rate-Range Rules," 7 W. H. REP. 772 (1944); but the
inclusion of length-of-service bonuses for the purpose of including them in wages to be
compared under the bracket system has been upheld. In re The Quaker Oats Co.,
NWLB No. 111-5422-D (7-D-873), Region VII, 18 WAR LAB. REP. 467 (1944).
And commission rates as well as incentive pay have also been included by at least one
regional board. In re Pacific lntermountain Express Co., NWLB No. l l 1-1614-D,
Region IX, 16 WAR LAB. REP. 732 (1944).
95
See In re American Keene Cement and Plaster Co., NWLB No. 111-8062HO, Region IX, 7 W. H. REP. 1015 (1944).
96
See pp. 1041-1044, infra.
97
In re Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Co., NWLB No. 2942-D (815), 14 WAR LAB.
REP. 557 (1944); In re Armour Fertilizer Works, NWLB No. lII-87(}-D (VIII-D30), 12 WAR LAB. REP. 128 (1924); In re Detroit Bevel Gear Co., NWLB No.
Ill-2621-D, Region XI, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 713 (1944) reversing 13 WAR LAB.
REP. 578 (1944); In re United States Gauge Co., NWLB No. 324 (2452-D), Region
III, 9 WAR LAB. REP. 304 (1943).
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existing differentials, 98 but differentials necessary to maintain 'productive efficiency. In other words the board permitted reductions of established differentials to some extent and the regional boards have usually
followed this method.
It seems reasonable to expect that once the board permitted such a
deviation from the established wage structure, the tapering method
would be based on recognized techniques of job evaluation. However,
the method generally has been merely to allow lower above-minimum
increases the greater the original rate of pay.90 That there has been no
utilization of evaluation techniques in connection with the tapering
principle seems evident,100 and this is obviously undesirable from the
point of view of preserving employee morale and incentive. Such
morale and incentive is perhaps to some extent preserved by the board's
policy, laid down in the Eberbest case,101 of permitting limited employer-union negotiation to determine tapered increases. Both employer and union will at least to some extent take morale and incentive
elements into consideration. And as shall be seen in the section dealing
with individual increases, in relatively few cases have job re-evaluation
and new rate schedules been ordered to correct intra-plant inequalities
in general, especially where no system of classification had been established in the past. 102
98
See Amendments ,to Wage and Salary Regulations Issued by the Director of
Economic Stabilization, Aug. 31, 1943, § 4001.II reprinted in 6 W. H. REP. 848
at 851 (1943).
99
In re Shirt Institute, Inc., NWLB Nos. II 1-1641-D, II 1-1862-D, I I 11546-D, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 81 (1943); In re Richmond Engineering Co., NWLB
No. 4299-AR (AR-445), 13 WAR LAB. REP. 421 (1944); cf. Instructions, Executive Order 9328, III-C-1 (1943) reprinted in 8 WAR LAB. REP. XXII at XXV
(1943).
100 This seems especially true where piece rates were involved. In re Shirt Institute, Inc., NWLB No. III-1641-D, 111-1862-D, III-1546-D, 13 WAR LAB. REP.
81 (1944); In re International Shoe Co., NWLB No. 111-2615-D, Region I, 14
WAR LAB. REP. 309 (1944). Of course job analysis techniques have been followed
in the occasional case where it had been undertaken by the company, In re The Boeing
Aircraft Co., NWLB No. 557, II WAR LAB. REP. (1943). See also GRAY,
SYSTEMATIC WAGE ADMINISTRATION IN THE SouTHERN CALIFORNIA AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY (1943), and in other cases where the entire wage structure was grossly inadequate. See pp. 1044-1046, infra.
101
In re Everbest Engineering Co., NWLB No. 551, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 607
(1943); In re Reynolds Metals Co., NWLB No. 2923-D (796), 14 WAR LAB. REP.
799 (1944).
_
102 The extent to which "established" rather than sound differentials are regarded
as important by the board may be illustrated by the fact that in an extreme case an
increase up to the going wage rates in the area which would disrupt an established
differential between markets. In re Southern California Telephone Co., NWLB No.
III-4647 (10-D-304), Region X, 7 W. H. REP. 1079 (1944).
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5. Inequalities and the Little Steel Formula. Certain further aspects of the interrelationship between the Little Steel formula and
inequalities remain to be considered. It has been noted that the inequalities doctrine played a role in determining offsettable and nonoffsettable increases even before April I 943; but it also had a further
effect on Little Steel increases. In the Lever Brothers case 103 the
board, shortly after the Little Steel decision, made it clear that where
a wage raise pursuant to a full I 5 per cent total allowance would result in serious unstabilizing effects on the local labor market, the total
maladjustment allowance would be proportionately reduced. 104 In
other words, where mechanics in one plant in an area were getting
eighty cents an hour and mechanics generally in the area were getting
eighty-five cents, mechanics in the first mentioned plant could never,
under the Lever Brothers doctrine, receive more than a five cent
increase under the formula, although, were the "inequalities" factor
not present, they would be entitled to as much as a ten or twenty cent
increase. Not only did this policy obviously conflict with the board's
objective of preserving labor's standard of living, but as already indicated in the discussion of the necessity for inequalities increases after the
"Hold-the-Line Order," it did not succeed in preventing inequalities
caused by the Little Steel formula. This was due first of all to the
switch of comparability units with respect to the application of the
Lever Brothers doctrine and the application of the general inequalities
doctrine. Thus, in applying the Lever Brothers doctrine a regional
board might compare merely the wages of workers doing comparable
work in the area, but in applying the inequalities doctrine a board in
another region might look to the wages paid in other plants in the
company. Thus an increase of five cents might not cause inequalities
in an area, but might, nevertheless, bring wages above those paid in
other plants of the company, necessitating a further inequalities increase in those other plants. This probably brought about the situation
in the aforementioned Atlas Cement case and similar cases then pend103

In re Lever Bros. Co., NWLB Nos. 149, I 76, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 48 ( I 942).
Id. at 54. In re American Wire Cloth Manufacturing Assn., NWLB No. I I 12482-D, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 197 (1944); In re New York Employing Printers Assn.,
Inc., NWLB No. III-90-R, 9 WAR LAB. REP. 469 (1943). In re Cleveland Newspaper Publishers Assn., NWLB No. 2987-D (858), 9 WAR LAB. REP. 370 (1943).
In re Smith and Wesson, Inc., NWLB No. 3D, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 346 (1942); In re
The Associated Milk Dealers, Inc., NWLB No. 271, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 183 (1942);
In re Motor Wheel Corp., NWLB No. III-221-C, Region XI, IO WAR LAB. REP.
714 (1943); cf. In re Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., NWLB No. 111-335-D, II WAR
LAB. REP. 592 (1944).
.
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ing before the board. Secondly, the Lever Brothers doctrine was
rarely applied so ·as to preserve sound differentials between wage
rates, although within a single Little Steel unit, this defect, as hereto. fore noted, was at least somewhat offset by the method of distribution
of wage increases adopted by the board. ·
With the establishment of wage brackets of "sound and tested"
area rates, the total maladjustment allowance under the Little Steel
formula has generally been reduced where application of the full r 5
per cent would yield final wage rates exceeding the marimum of such
brackets.105 This reduction of the total allowance so that the final
wages do not exceed bracket maxima, is optional with the region.al
boards. Moreover, the Lever Brothers doctrine has not entirely disappeared ~nd where serious unstabilizing effects on the local labor
market would be caused by rates exceeding the minimum or the average sound and tested rates, increases above ~uch wage levels have frequently been denied.106 Thus the board has at its disposal an arsenal
of weapons whic4 provides at least a rough method for integrating the
Little Steel formula with the inequalities doctrin~. First, it has the
leeway to allow wage oscillation over a range from. the minimum to
the maximum of a bracket. And second, it may clamp down wherever
necessary by applying the less statistical but sometimes more practical
Lever Brothers doctrine. Of course, it is obvious that all the difficulties of integration are not yet solved. Especially, the board's policy of
preserving labor's standard of living is still thwarted. A suggested
system of closer integration of the wage stabilization program must,
105

Instructions to Regional Boards, June IO, 1943, § III-A, reprinted in 1943.
W. H. MAN. 562 at 564. In re Detro.it Steel Products Co., NWLB No. I 11-4414-D,
Region XI, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 296 (1944); In re Centrifugal Fusing Co., NWLB
No. 2480-D, Region XI, 12 WAR LAB. REP. 270 (1943); In re Timken-Detroit
Axle Co., NWLB No. u1-073-D, Region XI, IO WAR LAB. REP. 720 (1943).
Frequently the increase has not been allowed above the minimum rates. In re J. S.
Bache and Co., NWLB No. 2740-D, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 390 (1944); In re Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., NWLB No. 2550-D, Region XI, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 416 (1944);
In re Denver Bakery Co., NWLB No. 111-1772-D (IX-D-49), Region IX, 12 WAR
· LAB. REP. 381 (1943). The maladjustment allowance has also been limited to the
average rates. In re Motor Wheel Corp., NWLB No. II 1-221-D, Region XI, 14
WAR LAB. REP. 646 (1944) affirming NWLB No. 111-221-C, Region XI, IO WAR
LAB. REP. 714 (1943). The matter is really optional with the regional boards for the
instruction, cited above, reads: "In maladjustment cases the Regional Boards should
consider whether or not, in cases where the I 5 per cent formula would move the
rate for any job classification above the maximum of the appropriate bracket the increase for sµch classification should be limited to the maximum of such bracket, and
the regional boards have consequently increased wages under Little Steel formula even
beyond the brackets. In re Seattle Master Printers Assn., Inc., NWLB No. 111-7562HO, Region XII, 7 ·w. H. REP. 824 (1944).
.
106
See cas'e cited note 104, supra.
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however, be left to the conclusion of this article, after other aspects of
the board's practice have been considered.

C. Effective Prosecution of the War
Still another type of incr~ase, over and above the wage level prevailing on September 15, 1942 which the board was authorized to
grant by Executive Order 9250, was that necessary "to aid in the
effective prosecution of the war." 101 This was to be the weapon required by the board to save the country from severe manpower crises.
While the "inequalities" doctrine was designed to prevent potential
manpower trouble, increases "to aid in the effective prosecution of the
war'' were to salvage more imminent manpower problems, of which
the aforementioned situation involving the non-ferrous metal workers
of Utah and Idaho is probably the more extreme example. But since
from an anti-inflationary point of view such increments were undesirable, the President eliminated them in his "Hold-the-Line Order,"
together with those necessary to correct inequalities.1° 8 It was mentioned earlier, however, that the powers subsequently given the board
by the Director of Economic Stabilization included that of granting
increases beyond the bracket minimum in "rare ·and unusual" cases.109
This grant amounted in effect to a restoration of the board's power to
grant increases "to aid in the effective prosecution of the war."
For increases granted under the label of "rare and unusual" have
been of the same type as those earlier granted "to aid in the effective
107
Executive Order No. 9250, 7 FED. REG. 196, p. 7871 (1942). For discussion of some of the early cases see Sheffield, "Wartime Wage Control," 11 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 399 at 420 (1943); 28 lowA L. REv. 671 (1943).
ios Executive Order No. 9328, April 10, 1943, 8 FED. REG. 71, p. 4681 (1943).
109
Policy Directive, May 12, 1943, § I reprinted in 8 WAR LAB. REP. XIV at
XV-XVI (1943); Instructions, Executive Order 9328, § 111-B (1) (1943) reprinted
in 8 WAR LAB. REP. XXII at XXIV. The following criteria are suggested to determine
an applicant's relation to the war effort:
"a. The establishment should be engaged primarily in an activity included in the
War Manpower Commission's List of Essential Activities or covered by the WMC's
designation of 'locally needed activities.'
"b.••. must have been in compliance with all the War Manpower Commission's regulations and policies with respect to recruitment, training, and utilization
of labor and with respect to operation on a Minimum Wartime Workweek (as defined
in Section 4 of WMC Regulation No. 3)." As to procedure in handling such cases
jointly by the War Manpower Commission and the War Labor Board, see War Manpower Commission, Field Instruction No. 160 (1943) reprinted in 13 WAR LAB. REP.
XXII ( 1944). But the mere testimony of war agency officials is not sufficient, where the
effect of the increase is unstabilizing and there is a lack of effort on the part of other
agencies to solve the manpower problem. In re Northwest Fir Cos., 16 WAR LAB.
REP. 6, 352 (1944). In re Western Electric Co., NWLB No. 13-456; 16 WAR LAB.
REP. 490 (1944).
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prosecution of the war." First, the cases where they were granted have
involved the problem of recruiting and maintaining a labor force. 110
Second, the type of wage levels to which wages involved in a "rare and
unusual" case could be raised might be those of the area, the industry,
other areas and other industries,111 just as in the earlier cases involving
increases "to aid in the effective prosecution of the war."
It would seem, therefore, that highly flexible criteria permitting
inflationary increases were thus restored despite the President's "Holdthe-Line Order." But while if expanded the new principle could prove
a convenient loophole to the nation's wage stabilization policy, it has
up to now been fairly strictly applied. The board's power may be exercised only where conditions are "grossly inequitable" or the increase
"highly essential to the success of the war effort." And in the Northwest Fir Companies case,112 decided on June r6, 1944, the board
elaborated further the conditions prerequisite to a "rare and unusual"
mcrease.
"r. The product or service involved must be of vital or critical importance to the war effort.
"2. There must be a convincing demonstration of a serious
manpower problem which cannot be solved by non-wage measures.
"3. There must be convincing evidence that the present wage
structure is outmoded and inadequate for the purpose of holding
or attracting the necessary supply of labor. '
"4. There must be a concerted program of the various wage
agencies concerned which is designed to remedy the manpower
and production problem and which necessitates a wage adjustment
as an indispensable part of the combined plan.
"5. Finally, there must be substantial evidence to demonstrate that a wage increase will accomplish the desired result and
that the advantages of a wage increase will not be-offset by undue
disruption of the wage structure of the industry or ·the region.113
110
See for example: In re Association of Team and Truck Owners, NWLB No.
24-966, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 32 (1944); In re Airesearch Manufacturing Co. of Arizona, Inc., NWLB No. X-u410, Region X, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 444 (1944); In re
Milk Products Manufacturers' Assn., NWLB No. 10-7210, Region X, 12 WAR LAB.
REP. 348 (1943).
111
ln re The Boeing Aircraft Co., NWLB No. 557, II WAR LAB. REP. 268
(1944) (comparison of aircraft company rates with those paid by shipbuilding companies). In re Akron Transportation Co., NWLB No. V-D-157 (u1-u81-D), Region V, I I WAR LAB. REP. 15 3 ( I 943) (Rates to transportation workers compared to
generally higher wages received by war workers); In re Fresno Employers Assn., NWLB
No. III-5571-D (10-D-358), Region X, 17 WAR LAB. REP. 53 (1944) ("Rare and
unusual" increase previously granted is extended to other firm in industry per area).
112
In re Northwest Fir Cos., 16 WAR LAB. REP. 352.
113
Id. at 358.
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In denying wage increases for 130,000 workers up to 25 cents an
hour, to approximate wages in the shipbuilding industry, despite
testimony of the War Production Board and the War Manpower
Commission that such increases were necessary to alleviate the serious
manpower shortage in this critically important industry, the board
considered the problem in the light of the above prerequisites. The
fifth prerequisite was not met because the aircraft and shipbuilding
industries were also faced with a manpower shortage. The area manpower problem would obviously not be solved by raising wages in one
industry where manpower is short in order to attract laborers from
another industry equally short handed. The third prerequisite was not
met since, in the northwest lumber industry, wages had already been
raised to the level of those prevailing in other industries in the area.
The objective sought by the applicants was to raise wages still further
so that they could compete with other vital industries for the available
manpower. And since the ~elective Service had failed to grant special
occupational deferments to men under 26 in the lumber industry and
the War Department had failed to give furloughs to skilled lumber
workers, the fourth test was also not met.
As long as the board, thus, restricts its power to grant "rare and
unusual" increases, no danger of a complete disruption of the board's
wage stabilization program springs from that quarter. It should be
mentioned, however, that the labor members dissented in the Northwest Lumber case and criticized t}:ie board for confining itself too much
to a consideration of recruiting problems while neglecting problems
of possible migration and turnover which were also present. But these
problems, it should be pointed out, involve matters of potential manpower ills and have probably not been corrected because of the inadequacies of the board's bracket system, discussed earlier. Correction of
such faults by increases in a single instance might create potential manpower ills in many other industries. These faults should therefore be
corrected only by a uniform change in policy, such as the determination of new labor market areas or the framing of bracket maxima and
minima on the basis of area-wide job evaluation. The emergency
power of granting increases in "rare and unusual" cases is therefore
properly confined to those instances where all has failed and manpower
must be recruited, if feasible, at any cost.
D. Substandards
A further group of increases has been permitted by the board over
the September I 5, I 942 wage level. The peacetime wage structure
included many rates that did not assure workers sufficient income to be
properly housed, clothed and fed and to provide for the welfare of
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their dependents. The exigencies of a war economy with its require~ent of maximum productive efficiency on the part of each worker
demand, however, that such "substandard" rates be eliminated. The
board, therefore, from its inception, and the President by Executive
Order 9250 permitted increases to bring such rates up to minimum
standards.114
I. Development Before April I943· The obvious inflationary
tendency of such increases was, at least potentially, enhanced during
the board's earlier period because of the board's utter lack of standard
as to what wages were insufficient or what wages were just sufficient
to provide for minimqm needs of workers.
,
Only General Orders 7 115 and 30,116 which permitted wage in-·
creases under the Fair Labor Standards Act and similar state laws, and
increases up to 40 cents ~n hour without board approval, provided
some sort of criterion for substandard increases. As to increases which
required board approval, early decisions simply described as "substandards" what the board later came to recognize as "inequalities." 117
And the board's .statement of policy, made shortly after Executive·
. Order 9250 simply stated that substandard cases will be decided "on
their individual merits." 118 This left the inflationary potentialities of
the substandards criterion practically unlimited.
2. Development After April I943· These inflationary potentialities of the "substandards" doctrine became serious with the issuance
of the President's. "Hold-the-Line Order" which discontinued increments to correct inequalities but left the board's substandard principle ,untouched. Substandards increases, unless somehow restricted,
could easily have provided an important loophole to the stricter equali_,,.
zation policy that followed the President's order.110 This potential
danger led to the formulation of more definite standards as to what
114
Executive Order No. 9250, 7 FED. REG. 196, p. 7871 (1942). For
discussion of some of the earlier cases see Sheffield, "Wartime Wage Control," I I GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 399 at 418 (1943); 28 lowA L. REv. 671 at 674 (1943).
115
NWLB General Order No. 7, Oct. 3 I, 1942, reprinted in 4 WAR LAB. REP.
XXI (1943). See note 109 supra.
116 NWLB General Order No. 30, Aug. 27, 1943, reprinted in IO WAR LAB.
REP. XX (1943).
117
See 91 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 340 at 351 (1942); 28 lowA L. REv. 371 at 374,
n. 13 (1943).
'
118 Sheffield, "Wartime· Wage Control," l I GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 399 at 418,
quoting from the President's Executive Order of October 3, 1942.
119
See for example an . early case subsequent to the issuance of the President's
"Hold-the-Line Order," where the board granted a 5 per cent increase as an "adjustment leading to the elimination of substandards," as a result of a panel recommendation that this increase be- granted in order to eliminate inequalities. In re General
Optical Co., NWLB No. 448 (2576), 9 WAR LAB. REP. 248 (1944).
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wages were insufficient and what wages were just sufficient to provide
for minimum needs of workers.
For most voluntary wage raise cases 55 cents an hour has become
the national maximum substandard level. Thus, an earlier authorization to the regional boards to grant increases up to 50 cents an hour,
without making an extensive wage analysis in all voluntary wage adjustment cases, pending their own determination of a standard wage,
was amended so as to make 50 cents the maximum standard that could
be established in a region.120 The only exception to this maximum were
increases under the Fair Labor Standards Act and similar state legislation which might bring rates above 50 cents an hour; but these became
subject to bbard approval. 121
Today "substandard" increases are controlled in the following way:
voluntary increments up to 55 cents an hour or other minimum standard rates lower than 55 cents determined by the regional boards usually
on an area basis, may be granted without board approval.122 In dispute
cases, the regional boards may use their discretion whether to raise
the rates up to the minimum substandard level or to use the appropriate bracket minima.128 And, just as in the case of Little Steel increases,
substandard increases may be accompanied by "tapered" adjustments
to higher paid employees to maintain minimum wage differentials.124
120

Amended instructions to Regional War Labor Boards on Determination of
Substandard Rates (1944), reprinted in 12 WAF.. LAB. REP. XXXVI (1944) amending
earlier instructions reprinted in 6 WAR LAB. REP. XVII (1943). For an example of
a regional substandards limit below 50 cents see Determination of Substandard Rates
by the Cleveland Regional War Labor Board (1944) reprinted in 14 WAR LAB. REP.
XXXVIII ( I 944) ( 4 5 cents established for Kentucky).
121
The exact wording of the Order is: " ... the National War Labor Board
hereby approves increases in wage and salary rates made in compliance with such
statutes •.. provided, however, that, if my changes in such statutes ... are made or
promulgated after April 8, 1943, increases in wage or salary rates directed thereby
which would result in £ wage or salary rate in excess of 50 cents per hour may not be
made without the approval of the Board." NWLB General Order No. 7, Oct. 31,
1942, reprinted in 1943 W. H. MAN. 536 at 537. See note 103 supra.
122
See Resolution issued by National War Labor Board, Feb. 26, 1945, 8 W. H.
REP. 234 (1945). According to the resolution, these increases are subject to the approval of the Economic Stabilization Director if they are to be used as the basis for a
petition for price relief.
128
In this connection the minimum substandard level has been determined on· an
industry basis. See for example, In re Shirt Institute, Inc., NWLB Nos. I I 1-1641-D,
111-1862-D, III-1546-D, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 81 (1943); but cf. In re Elite Laundry Co., NWLB No. 111-7834-D, Region III, 19 WAR LAB. REP. 321 (1944),
where the public members seemed to think application of bracket standards mandatory
in a dispute case. See also Chairman Davis' testimony on Senate Resolution to raise
substandard wage floor to 65 cents, reported in 7 W. H. REP. 1098 (1944).
124
In re National Assn. of Manufacturers of Pressed and Blown Glassware, NWLB
No. 111-4919-D, 18 WAR LAB. REP. 53 (1944).
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While, as has been indicated, the establishment of more definite
criteria for "substandard" increases was essential from the point of
view of maintaining ipflation control, the establishment of a fixed
55 cent minimum was probably not desirable. A resolution was recently introduced in the Senate to raise the wage floor to 6 5 cents an
hour. 125 But this, too, would. not remedy the situation. For certainly
the cost of minimum needs varies from region to region and might
well reach above the aforementioned arbitrary figures. Thus, on the
basis of an emergency budget developed by the WPA in 1935,126 the
Textile Workers Union recently computed 71.5 cents and 73.6 cents
as the minimum hourly rate tor four southern plants and one northern
plant, respectively. 121 Regional boards should at least have retained
their power of fixing their own minimum standard on the basis of studies made in the various communities involved without any fixed limitation superimposed by the national board.
Finally, it seems erroneous to establish a limit in terms of substandard hourly straight-time rates, for these must always be otherwise
translated. To someone working only 40 hours a week a rate below
50 cents an hour might be substandard. On the other hand to someone
working 48 hours or even more it might well not be. A maximµm limit or wage floor should therefore have been imposed in terms
of take-home wages and not hourly wage rates.

II
MISCELLANEOUS

w AGE ADJUSTMENTS

It has already been pointed out that merit increases within a given
rate range, reclassifications and promotions, automatic length of service
increases, and increases made as a result of an apprentice or trainee
program are essential to the maintenance of proc;luctive efficiency. They
have, as a consequence, not b·een subjected to the more stringent control
applicable to general increases. But this does not mean that they have
escaped control altogether, for the board has regulated these further
wage rate adjustments from the point of view.of two principal aims;
to prevent their being more inflationary than necessary, and to forestall
their use as a mere disguise of general wage increases which would be
subject to more stTingent control.
While inter-plant inequalities have been discussed from the point
125

"Labor Organizations on Wage-Hour Policy," 7 W. H. REP. 1096 (1944).
The budget is characterfzed by the WPA as "an emergency standard which
may be necessary under depressed conditions."
127
7 W. H. REP. 937 (1944). See also· 42 CoL. L. REv. 1320 at 1327-1328
(1942).
.
126
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of view of their alleviation by means of general increases to maintain
or eliminate differentials existing within a plant, the method previously discussed involved increases to groups of workers whose jobs had
either already been properly classified or assumed to be so classified.
The change generally was one in wage rates only, and did not involve
a change of the wage structure such as is accomplished by the reclassification of jobs and a corresponding rate change thereafter. Therefore,
when the lack of the use of job evaluation techniques· was earlier
pointed out, the reader was warned that the criticism applied only to
general increases effected in the way there described and not to the cases
where further adjustments due to reclassification and other causes listed
above have been regulated by the board. For where inequalities have
involved the correction of wage rate relationships by means of reclassification, the regional boards have been instructed to do so with due
regard for
"(a) Maintaining proper rate balance among the various job
classifications;
"(b) Avoiding creation of unstabilizing inter-establishment
effects;
" ( c) Avoiding appreciable increases in production costs
through application of the principle that normally there should
be no appreciable increase in the average of job rates." 128
And in this connection the boards have directed job classification surveys, ordered the parties to consult with a technical advisor, designated
rate schedules, standardized job titles and directed the adoption of a
particular job evaluation plan.129 And the board has more recently
announced that the new rates, resulting from reclassification, are not
governed by "going wage" brackets, but only by the standard of maintaining production costs. 130 Yet rates in the area should, according to
128

Amended Instruction to Regional War Labor Boards and Commissions for
Operation Under Executive Order 9328 and under the Supplementary Directive of
May 12, 15 WAR LAB. REP, XLI at XLV (1944).
129
See for example: In re George A. Fuller Co., NWLB No. I 1-5259-D, 18
WAR LAB. REP. 619 (1944); In re Big Four Meat Packing Co., NWLB Nos. I II5759-D, 111-5762-D, 20 WAR-LAB. REP. 210 (1944). In re Armstrong Cork Co.,
NWLB No. 2471-D (343), IO WAR LAB. REP. 69 (l943), In re American Optical
Co., NWLB No. 13-274, II WAR LAB. REP, 765 (1943); In re Niles Bement-Pond
Co., NWLB No. 340, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 489 (1943); In re General Chemical Co.,
NWLB No. 267, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 387 (1942); In re West Coast Airframe Cos.,
NWLB Nos. 174,307,557,558,608,609,610,673, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 581 (1943).
130
But according to the last official action of former Economic Stabilization Director Fred Vinson, reclassification increases may be made without regard to production
costs if the average increase for all employees in the unit does not exceed I cent or
I per cent and even these limits may be disregarded by the board in rare and unusual
cases. 8 W. H. REP. 265 (1945).
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the board, not become unstabilized as a result of reclassification. 131
But if the going rates are the test of rate stability in the area, then ho'Y
is the new rate structure to avoid having an unstabilizing effect on area
rates, if it is allowed to exceed the going rates? And indeed, the board
in giving such free reign to its reclassification powers has been accused
of forging a new loophole into its wage stabilization policies.132 On the
other hand, if the going wage rates were to limit the board's reclassification powers, then the value of these powers would be considerably
lessened. For, where rate differentials between classifications are not
only unsouud in the particular plant where the wage structure is being
revamped, but in the entire area, the board's' order to re-evaluate jobs
would do little good since the unsound rate structure of the area, as
reflected by the brackets, will stand in the way of the required change.183
But except for this difficulty the board's attempt to rationalize the wage
structures of industry has been a desirable one and foreshadows, probably; the coming of a sounder national wage policy in the future,
brought about through encouragement ·and aid by government agencies.
While the determination of proper job classifications is desirable
from the point of view of preventing intra-plant inequalities, it does
not mark the end of the board's effort. For the mere fact that an employer has a paper schedule of proper job classifications does not prevent him from labeling anyone a first class mechanic, for example, in
order to pay him a higher wage. Indiscriminate "promotion'~ and individl;lal "reclassification" would thus become an easily available subterfuge by means of which general wage increases could be effected.
Similarly many employers h~ve rate ranges for each job classification,
ranging from minimum to maximum, with the particular wage paid to
each employee depending on some standard of his merit or length of
service. What is to prevent an employer from effecting a general increase by simply raising the wages of all his employees in a given
classification up to the maximum of the particular rate range? The
incentive feature of the rate range would thus be lost and an inflationary increase would result.
131
ln re Atlantic Coast Shipyards, NWLB No.' 111-21701-D (25-319-D), 18
WAR LAB. REP. 489 (1944). In the more recent cases the-board has recommended
that intra-plant inequalities be corrected by comparing rates in other plants in the industry ·and has directed the use of guide rates, i.e., approximately average rates being
paid for a certain job in a labor market area, beyond which adjustments may not be
made. See 7 W. H. REP. 488 (1944); 8 W. H. REP. 162 (1945); 8 W. H. REP.
197 (1945).
132
ln re Atlantic Coast Shipyards, NWLB No. 111-21701-D (25-319-D), 18
WAR LAB. REP. 489 at 500 (1944).
188 This plan, as is clearly seen from the text ·that follows, is in addition to the
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To forestall such practices the board has made subject to its approval all individual increases by a company that has not adopted the
board's Model Plan.134 This plan places arbitrary limits on the number
and amount of increases within job classifications or those due to promotions and individual reclassifications. Increases within job classification rate ranges have thus not been permitted to exceed IO cents
per straight time hour or more than two-thirds of the difference between the appropriate minimum or maximum rate, whichever is greater.
M_oreover, the total yearly expenditure devoted to such adjustments
has not been permitted to exceed an average of 5 cents per straighttime hour for all the employees in the establishment.185 Finally, specific
methods for budgeting and recording such increases throughout the
year have been prescribed by the board in order to prevent employers
from still disguising general wage increases as individual increases by
creating fixed funds for wage increases equal to 5 cents for each man
hour worked during the year, and by withholding all wage adjustments fot a six months period and then increasing all employee's rates
by IO cents an hour on the theory that they average no more than 5
cents yearly, and do not total more than 5 cents per individual.186
The Model Plan has further prescribed that individual increases
due to promotions and individual reclassifications may usually not exceed I 5 per cent of an employee's former wage, or the minimum rate
job classifications approved by the board. Of course in addition to cla~ifications approved by the board, an employer may follow a classification which he had already
established, prior to the full development of the stabilization program. As to what
constitutes job classifications which do not require board approval, see NWLB General
Order No. 31, Aug. 24, 1943 (amended), § II-A, B, reprinted in 9 WAR LAB. REP.
XVII at XVlll (1944).
184
See for example In re Owens-Illinois Glass Co., NWLB No. I I 1-9454 ( 10-D582), RegionX, 21 WAR LAB. REP. 210 (1945).
185
NWLB General Order No. 3 I, Aug. 24, 1943, § II-C-1 (c), reprinted 9
WAR LAB. REP. XVII at XIX, the IO cents per hour increase must be applied to the
basic hourly rate, The 5 cent limitation is to be applied to the basic average straighttime hourly rate. Interpretative Bulletin No. 2 to General Order No. 31 (1944),
reprinted in 13 WAR LAB. REP. XIV (1944). Such fund may be reviewed from year
to year. See 7 W. H. REP. 667 (1944).
The problem arises, when rate ranges are moved up to the going wage brackets,
as to what amount of the increase to individual's resulting therefrom should be offset
against the limit provided for in General Order No. 3 I. Such increase is not to be
offset if the weighted average of individual employees' rates within the new range does
not exceed midpoint of the new rate range. Any increase to individuals which does
raise the average above the widepoint of the rate range must be offset against the limit.
See WLB Amended Instructions to Regional Boards: Individual Wage Adjustments
Within Changed Rate Ranges, reprinted in 16 WAR LAB. REP. VIII (1944).
186
See Interpretative Bulletin No. 2 to General Order No. 31 (1944), reprinted
in 13 WAR LAB. REP. XIV (1944).
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of the new job whichever is the higher.137 Apprentice programs under
this plan have had to conform to existing collective bargaining agreements or regulations of federal or state agencies.138
It cannot be denied that this detailed regulation has probably been
very effective in preventing the substitution of individual increases for
general increases. And while this prevents inflation to some extent,
it does not mean that actual individual increases have been rendered
non-inflationary. For while there is the general limitation that production costs must not be increased due to individual increases or recla~sifications,189 a control which has previously been criticized as one-sided,
the restrictions imposed by the Model Plan have still left sufficient
amounts for individual increases to render them inflationary. On the
other hand, it should be pointed out that there is at least some danger
that these restrictions instead of regulating individual increases in such
a way as to prevent their becoming more inflationary than necessary,
may, because of their very arbitrariness limit individual increases so
far as to render them ineffective to preserve employee morale and
incentive. And this is so, even though employees, in conjunction with
their unions, may submit individual wage increment plans of their own
for board approval; for the board has usually compared these plans
with its Model Plan and disapproved of those that deviated too much
from the latter.140
187

Except where an employee has special ability. NWLB General Order No. 31,
Aug. 24, 1943, (amended) § II-C-2, reprinted in 9 WAR LAB. REP. XVII at XIX
(1944).
138
Apprentice on trainee programs may be changed, however, in the light of
increased production, provided such changes are approved by the board. Id. at
§ II-C-3, p. XIX.
.
.
189
Id. at§ II-D (2), p. XIX. For detailed.requirements as to information from
employers, see id. at § III. New York Regional WLB: Instructional Bulletin Relating
to individual Wage and Salary Increases (1944), reprinted in 14 WAR LAB. REP.
XXX (1944). This requirement is based on limitations which were imposed by the
Economic Stabilization Director: Since these limitations no longer exist with respect
to merit increases, the board is expected to remove them as far as they concern this
type of increase. 8 W. H. REP. 265 (1945).
140
But the board has recently formulated an alternative plan to that in General
Order No. 31. The board will approve automatic progressions from minimum to
maximum agreed to by union and employer, "provided that the rates of such progressions are no faster than 12 months for unskilled jobs, 18 months for semi-skilled jobs,
and 29 months for skilled jobs." Or where such progressions are only up to the midpoint of rate ranges, these may be approved "provided that the speed of such progressions are no faster than four months for unskilled jobs, six months for semi-skilled
jobs, and 8 months for skilled jobs." Usually "the regional boards and Industry commissions shall consider" the lowest third of an establishment's jobs to be unskilled
jobs, the middle third to be semi-skilled j_obs, and the top third to be skilled jobs.
WLB Press Release B-1773, Oct. 2, 1944.
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III
METHODS OF WAGE PAYMENT

Methods of wage payment, traditionally established, or providing
further employee incentive, such as wages paid in accordance with pro-,
ductive output and bonuses, have as already indicated escaped strict
anti-inflationary wage control. However, the board has attempted to
impose some form of control so that these wage payment methods do
not become too inflationary. Such control has once more been either a
one-sided prevention of inflation consisting of maintaining established
production costs, or an attempt, as in the case of bonuses, not to permit
these beyond the amount absolutely necessary to prevent labor friction. The rather limited control of these methods of wage payment of
which one at least resembles very much a general increase in ultimate
result, illustrates once more the impossibility of very effective antiinflation control on the wage payment level.

A. Group Incentive Plans
One of these methods of wage payment that has received increasing board attention is the group incentive plan. Despite traditional
labor opposition to incentive systems of wage payment,141 . the group
incentive plan, which provides for general wage increments in proportion to a rising level of production, usually within a single plant, resulting from increased employee group effort, has become increasingly
popular.142 And since the Grumman Aircraft case,143 the board has
tried to develop criteria for approval of such plans 144 that would pre141
See for example 25 A.F. OF L. REP. OF PROCEEDINGS 105 (1905); 29 id.
212 (1909); 33 id. 384 (1913); 34 id. 83 (1914); 35 id. 106 (1915); 36 id.
92 (1916); 38 id. 121 (1918); 39 id. 121 (1919); 40 id. 119 (1920); 41 id.
119 (1921); 42 id. 109 (1922); 43 id. 295 (1923); 44 id. 294 (1924); 46 id.
393 (1926); 53 id. 475 (1933).
142
Formal labor opposition continued. 63 id. 411 (1943); Orders by Clinton S.
Golden, Assistant to the President of the United Steelworkers of America before New
York Chapter of the Society for the Advancement of Management, Nov. 20, 1943.
The United Automobile Workers also expressed opposition. 6 W. H. REP. 971
(1943). But such plans have been accepted by unions since they provide opportunity
for increases beyond those permissible under other wage stabilization criteria.
148
In re Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., NWLB No. l 3-28 5, l 1 WAR
LAB. REP. 322 (1943).
144
General Order No. 3 8, Nov. 2, 1944, Press Release B-18 l 3, reprinted in
7 W. H. REP. 1037 (1944) requires that the institution of a new incentive wage or
piece rate, the extension of an established wage or piece rate ( one in existence prior to
Oct. 3, 1942, or one approved by the national board since that date, or placed in effect
without approval pursuant to General Order No. 6) to departments not yet covered
thereby, or the change or modification of an established incentive rate, be approved by
the board except where the rate is changed to reflect a change in method, product,
tools, material design or production conditions.
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vent these from resulting in "hidden" wage increases contrary to wage
stabilization policies. Such criteria required merely that any plan must
be submitted by both empl0yer and union in conjunction,145 and that it
must not raise the level of production costs. Of course, such plans had
to be based on employee group effort, and increases based on increased
output due t.o changes in machinery or expansion of personnel have not
been permitted.146 Such plans, consequently, }:lad to contain provisions
for the resetting of piece rates when~ver changes are made in methods,
tools, materials or products.147
Actually such criteria for approval represent an additional and more
lenient general wage increment formula; 148 for group incentive plans
culminate in general increases which are merely made conclitional on
greater group productivity. How different such group incentive plans
are from individual incentive systems is illustrated by the fact that such
145

But once submitted, later union opposition will be ineffective in removing
the plan unless it can be shown to be unworkable and unfair: In re Standard Register
Co., NWLB No. III-3729-HO, Region V, 8 W. H. REP. 232 (r945).
146
See Instructions by Wage Stabilization Director of Regional War Labor Board
. XI (1943) reprinted in 13 WAR LAB. REP. XXX at XXX-XXXI (1944); Boston RWLB; Policy on Wage Incentives (1944), pt. I§ 6, reprinted in 15 WAR LAB.
REP.LVIII at LIX (1944); In re American Tool Works Co., NWLB No. \'-D-43 (111564-D), Region V, II WAR LAB. REPo1651 (1943) (incentive earnings increase,
where increase of production due to expansion of personnel held not exempt from Little Steel formula). The converse, however, does not seem to have been established
and workers have been denied increases in piece rates where there has been a decrease
in earnings as a result of decreased output to deteriorating machinery. In re Corwin
Cotton Mills Co., NWLB No. 111-1100-HO, Region IV, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 554
The Detroit Regional Board has declared, however, that opportunity for earnings must be
maintained. Instructions by Wage Stabilization Director of Regional War Labor
Board XI (1943), reprinted in 13 WAR LAB. REP. XXX (1944). See also Boston
RWLB; Policy on Wage Incentives (1944), pt. II, reprinted in 15 WAR LAB. REP.
-LVIII at LX (1944).
147
·
Detroit Regional War Labor Board: Policy on Incentive Systems (1943) § 8
reprinted in 13 WAR LAB. REP. XXIX (1944); Boston RWLB; Policy on Wage Incentives (1944), pt. I§ (2), reprinted in 15 WAR LAB. REP. LVIII at LIX (1944).
Tentative rates may always be changed without board approval. But under the Boston
regional board instructions, no plan is permanently approved until six months after
its operation and the submission of two reports to the board for approval at threemonths intervals.
148
Regional Boards, however, have required that incentive plans meet stricter
criteria more in keeping with their general wage increase nature. Thus the Chicago
board requires that plan should not unstabilize wages in the area, nor result in intraplant inequalities. "RWLB Standards for Incentive Wage Plans," 7 W. H. REP. 20.
(1944) On the other hand, the actions of the Cleveland board clearly illustrates how
wage incentive plans might violate general wage increase criteria. The board allowed
the minimum going wage rates as the worker's guaranteed wage with the worker's
base rate and earnings left undisturbed. Thus a worker might have a base rate of
$. 70 an hour, earn $ I .oo an hour under the incentive plan, while his guaranteed
wage is $.80 an hour, the area going wage minimum. 7 W. H. REP. 41 (1944).
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group plans provide for general increments even to non-production
workers in relation to the rise of productivity. And such plans have been
approved by the board; 149 for example, non-production workers in the
Westinghouse Electric Company are given an increase varying in
amount from plant to plant, as the efficiency of the incentive production workers exceeds the production standard by r 5 per cent, the payment to non-production workers being somewhat smaller than that
received by the production workers. 150
Despite resemblance of the group incentive plan to a general wage
increase system, their control from the point of view of preventing
inflation is the one-sided maintenance of production costs, employed in
the case of individual increases. From a practical point of view, however, these increases serve the purpose of increasing production,151
which also forms the basis of most individual increments. And where
these increases do not constitute genuine rewards for productive effort
they have not been permitted. It follows, therefore, that the permission of these increases seems justified, unless some non-inflationary
method for achieving increased productivity can be discovered.

B. Bonus Payments
The control of bonus payments has largely been based on the
policy of avoiding labor friction. To this end bonuses that had been
part of the wage structure in the past were exempted from the requirement of board approval.152 Such payments, therefore, have not been
permitted to exceed the fixed total amount paid to an individual during
the preceding bonus year for like work,153 or if paid on a percentage
or incentive basis the rate and method of computation may not be
149
In re Firestone Rubber & Metal Products Co., NWLB No. I I 1-1910-D, Region XI, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 621 (1944); In re Pittsburgh Des Moines Co., NWLB
No. 25-548-A, Shipbuilding Commission, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 491 (1944); Lehigh
Structural Steel Co., NWLB No. 35380, Region Ill, 12 WAR LAB. REP. 339 (1944).
150
In re Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co., NWLB No. III-1394-D, 13
WAR LAB. REP. 788 (1944) and discussion in 7 W. H. REP., p. 4 (1944).
151
Nickerson, "Why Wage Incentives Work," 1 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY
391 (1943); Address before American Society of Mechanical Engineers, December I,
1943. During two months of operation of forty-nine plans approved by the Regional
War Labor Boards production increased on the average of 27.9 per cent above standard and 41.5 per cent above past performance.
152
NWLB General Order No. 10, Nov. 6, 1942, § 803.IO(a), reprinted in
4 WAR LAB. REP. XXIV (1943).
158
Id.§ 803.rn(a) (1), p. XXIV; In re Longhorn Portland Cement Co., NWLB
No. III-2II5-D, II WAR LAB. REP. 588 (1943); See for example, the recent summary of New York rulings in MANUAL OF BoNus RULINGS BY NEW YoRK REGIONAL
BoARD issued Nov. 30, 1943, Questions 6-1 I, reprinted in 12 WAR LAB. REP. XLI
at XLII (1943).
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changed. 1 ;;-1 And no board approval is required for bonuses not exceeding 2. 5 cents in cash value.1~ 5
Where the criteria for permitting bo}lus payments without board
approval concerned payments of ·fixed total amounts, the resulting
anti-inflationary control has been complete, for the yearly wage level
of employees has not been permitted to change. Where based on a percentage basis, however, the control is at best the one-sided one of maintaining production costs, which can be justified only on the basis of the
incentive provided by such bonuses.
The incentive which they provide would also justify bonuses that
have been approved by way of compensation for increased work loads.156
However, bonuses that have been approved because if not paid they
would constitute a "manifest injustice," cannot be justified either as _
aiding in complete inflation control or as providing necessary incentives.
Such a case would arise where an employer in paying a bonus the preceding year "inadvertently" left out a group of employees. 157 The
new bonus to this group of employees probably avoids labor friction,.
however, and may thus be explained. Indeed; this theory also serves
as a generic explanation for the emphasis on traditional bonuses and the
allowance of bonuses to compensate for increased work loads. The
board's bonus policy may, therefore, be said to permit payments which
would smooth over any undue labor friction that might have been
caused by application of the wage stabilization program, unless such
payments are grossly inflationary. 15 s
iH NWLB General Order No. ro, Nov. 6, 1942, § 803.ro(a) (2), reprinted
in 4 WAR LAB. REP. XXIV (1943). See for recent example, In re Longhorn Portland
Cement Co., NWLB No. 111-2u5-D, I I WAR LAB. REP. 588 (1943) and the
recent summary of New York decisions in MANUAL OF BoNus RULINGS BY NEw YoRK
REGIONAL BoARD, issued Nov. 30, 1943, Questions 12-16, reprinted in 12 WAR LAB.
REP. XLI at XLII (1944). Bonuses as rewards for production ideas may also be
given without board approval. Letter by John B. Chamberlin, Assistant General
Counsel of _the War Labor Board to Channing Dooley, Director of Training Within
Industry, War Manpower Commission, Aug. 30, 1943, reprinted in 10 WAR LAB.
REP. XXXV (1944). Where a bonus is computed on a percentage or similar basis and
this method yields a smaller amount for the current year than was paid in the preceding
year the employer may if he chooses, pay in 1943 the same total amount that was paid
in 1942.
155
7 w. H. REP. 1072 (1944) .
156
•
ln re Washington, D.C., Transit Cos., NWLB Nos. 13-264, 13-271, 14 WAR
LAB. REP. 805 (1944); In re Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co., Inc.,
13 \VAR LAB. REP. 472 (1943); cf. MANUAL OF Bomra RULINGS BY NEw YoRK RE-GI5>NAL BOARD issued Nov. 30, 1943, Question 52, reprinted in 12 WAR LAB. REP.
XLI at XLVII (1944).
157
See MANUAL FOR BoNus RULINGS BY NEw YoRK REGIONAL BoARD, issued
Nov. 30, 1943, Questions 46-48, reprinted in 12 WAR L\B. REP. XLI at XLVIXLVII (1944).
156
Other criteria for the approval of bonus payments applied by the board are,
that they conform to the practice prevailing in the. industry and area before October,
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IV
•
CONCLUSION

'

From what has been said up to now it is already clear that inflation
control on the wage payment level is far from perfect, and that its
imperfections are not easily remedied, for they seem inevitable consequences of broader economic considerations that must be heeded by
the regulatory agency. The available statistics corroborate this finding.
According to a recent study 159 weekly qianufacturing payrolls for
wage-earners from January 1939 to January 1944 have increased by
approximately 250 per cent or $439,125,000, bringing the total up to
$617,300,000. This increase did not occur entirely before wage stabilization; for, from the middle of 1943 when wage stabilization was well
under way, to January 1944, the total manufacturing weekly payroll
rose by approximately $21,200,000. To a large extent factors such as
overtime premium pay, which, as has already been noted, have not been
too stringently controlled, account for this increase. The total payments
for overtime premium pay rose from approximately $2,000,000 weekly
in January 1935 to $41,600,000 in the middle of 1943 and $43,600,000 in January 1944. Thus in spite of wage stabilization, the relative importance of this component payroll factor did not diminish, but
actually increased. Factors such as intra-industry upgradings, incentive
payments, increased piece rate earnings, which, as already mentioned,
are also not subject to stringent wage control, account for 32 per cent
of the increase in payrolls.
In addition, factors not heretofore emphasized, which also are not
subject to control at the wage payment level went to make up a great
part of the remainder of the overall increase in payrolls. Redistribution of employees, so that more were working at higher paying jobs
than those at which they had been working in January, 1939 would
pay, account for I I per cent of the payroll increase. Increases in the
average workweek account for a $72,000,000 increase in weekly payrolls. Since $61,555,000 of this increase occurred in war industries,
i.e., benefited those for the most part not engaged in the production
l 942 and that they do not create unequities in existing rates paid fo. similar work.
''Vacation Award on Little Steel Basis," 7 W. H. REP. 1072 (1944). Where these
are strictly applied the bonus is not in a much better position than the General Wage
Increase, except for the Little Steel formula. The only reason for exempting it then
from wage brackets is the fact, heretofore noted, that many bonuses are not included in
bracket determinations.
159

Bratt and Danhoff, "Components of Wartime Wage Changes," SuRVEY
CURRENT BusINEss, Sept., 1944, p. 17.
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of consumer goods, the increase is substantially inflationary. And
finally, increased employment, again occurring primarily in war industries, accounts for a very large part of the overall increase.
While these figures seem to indicate that the American worker has
fared far too well despite wage, stabilization, it must not be forgotten
that imperfections in the wage stabilization pattern adopted by the
board are such that inflation control has been stricter with respect to
some workers than others, who have been more frequently involved in
situations affecting "inequalities" and incentive and morale aspects of
existing wage pa(terns. Though all that can be gathered from the overall statistics is a greater proportionate increase in war, as compared to
non-war,and in manufa~turingas compared to non-manufacturing industries, it is undoubtedly true, that many workers have had their wages
controlled by the Little Steel formula, without being able to take advantage of ,its many necessary loopholes. Labor's objei:;tion to the 15
per cent limitation 160 of the formula seems therefore not to be entirely
unjustified. This is especially so, since the cost of living has risen 23.4
per cent161 and 43.5 per cent1° 2 from January 1, 1941 to December,
l 943 according to the :tindings of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and those of labor unions respectively; and the President's Cost of
Living Committee has reported a rise of 30 per cent.168 At least, those
workers who cannot benefit from increases exempted under the formula must have suffered a loss in real wages, due to this discrepancy.
On the other hand, the solution offered, namely a general upping
of Little Steel formula to let's say 20 or even 30 per cent seems most
inadequate. First, unless accompanied by a general disruption of present wage brackets, it would effect little change, since, as earlier indicated, it is the ~urrent practice not to permit Little Steel increases,
beyond bracket maxima. Second, if it is at all feasible to effect. a general change iii present wage brackets, then the result sought should
reach beyond that accomplished by the mere µpping of the formula.
For a mere increase in the total maladjustment allowance cannot eliminate many of the contradictions of the wage stabilization program
heretofore noted. A new arbitrary limit merely allows further inflation
160
See, KEEP WAGES FREE FOR A FREE AMERICA! (C.I.O. Pamphlet No. 58,
1942); 62 A. F. OF L. REP. OF PROCEEDINGS 217-18 (1942); 49 AMERICAN FEDERATIONISTS, 4~5, 29 (1942); "A.F.L. Scores Wage Freezing of WLB Wage Powers,"
6 W. H. REP. 1004 (1943), 63 A.F. OF L. REP. OF PROCEEDINGS 229, 505, 202,
502 (1943); MEANY AND THOMAs, CosT OF LIVING (1944); Ruttenberg, "Wages and,
the Cost of Living," NEW REPUBLIC, April IO, 1944, 489.
,
, 161 THE CosT OF LIVING INDEX, Burea1+ of Labor Statistics Bull. (U.S. Dept. of
Labor, 1944) i, I.
162
MEANY AND THoMAs, CosT OF LIVING, 5 (1944).
168
See "Living Costs and the Little Steel Rule," 7 W. H. REP. 1097 (1944).
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but does not gear the new wage increases to the rise in the cost of living
in particular communities or for particular occupations requiring work
clothes and tools, the price of which has increased beyond the national
average. Nor does this higher limit integrate the board's equalization
policy as represented by the bracket system. Such an integrated wage
stabilization program does, however, suggest itself as a result of the
analysis earlier presented and is here offered in its broad outlines
without any judgment as to the administrative difficulties of effectuating it, or the desirability of doing so at this stage of the war.
First, regional war labor boards should undertake careful studies to
discover labor market areas of potential labor migration which might
constitute a neighborhood as found in a recent New England study 16¼
or include broader areas. Certain industries, such as the non-ferrous
metals and transit industry, for example, should be exempted from
these areas, and labor market areas extending over several states might
be designated for them. As factors of potential labor migration become
less significant with the advent of peace, such considerations as the
administrative feasibility of industry-wide wage administration 165 as advocated by the Congress of Industrial Organization might occasion a
shift from geographical to functional labor market areas and preparation therefor might begin now.
Second, a maladjustment allowance based on the actual increase in
the cost of living in the labor market area since January 1941 should be ·
determined. And this maladjustment percentage should be added to
the January 1941 take-home pay of each worker, or to what can reasonably be estimated as the amount he would have received had he
been doing the same work in January 1941, provided that where such
take-home pay is substandard, the percentage allowance be applied to
an earning base that under local conditions would provide for adequate
health and decency requirements. This will give us the permissible
wage of each worker in the area.
Third, occupations in each area should be classified in terms of job
evaluation descriptions with point evaluations assigned to each in terms
of factors earlier mentioned, and a curve, A, should be constructed to
show adequate differentials between occupations in the area. The permissible wages should then be averaged per occupation per area, as
164

MYERS, THE MovEMENT OF FACTORY WoRKERs, A STUDY OF A NEw ENGLAND INDUSTRIAL COMMUNITY, 1937-39 and 1942 (1943).
165
The Board is of course aware of the problem and ready to make changes in
the appropriate direction when the proper time comes. See 8 W. H. REP. 193, 194;
see also note 90 supra and cf. In re General Motors Corp., NWLB No. -11 r-4665-D,
8 W. H. REP., p. 287 (1945), which indicates the board's willingness to, at least,
study the question.
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determined by the earlier job evaluation program. This will yield a
curve, B, of permissible wages for the labor market area.
Finally, on the basis of the "going" take-home wages in one or two
key occupations among a group of related jobs in an area, the job
classification curve, A, previously described, may be translated into the
proper money wages per occupation, but adjustment must be made
in such a way that the resulting money wage curve, C, nowhere exceeds the permissible wage curve, B. The curve, C, represents the maximum take home money wages that may be paid in an area and should
in the future simply be adjusted upward in accord with further average
increases in the ,cost of living of the area. Overtime, bonus and other
incentive money payments would now be included within the wage
designated by curve, C. Where further incentive payments, etc. are re- quired by production needs, these should be in non-negotiable war
bonds, or should go into employee trust funds, long advocated by both
unions and employers but apparently rejected by the board. Of course
these payments must never result in higher prices for the goods produced, especially if these are consumer goods, though it probably would
be reasonable in many instances, to endorse this price maintenance by
a reduction of employer profits.
The suggested program does not, of course, do away with most of
the inadequacies of inflation control on the wage payment level. Effective and more uniform economic stabiliiation can only be achieved
by price control, rationing and taxation, outlined by the President in
April 1942, but up to now, inadequate in practice.166 And such controls
should probably be coupled with attempted reorganization of wasteful
processes in the production and distribution of consumer goods,167 a
technique seemingly neglected by the governmental program.
166

The weakness is indicated by the OPA's seeming lack of control over quality
deterioration, or upgrading of existing goods coupled with a disappearance of lowpriced items, MEANY AND THOMAS, THE CosT OF LIVING 9, 34-38, 51, 104, 89-90
(1944); by the great number of violations of OPA regulations, id at 70; and by the
number of factually authorized price break-throughs, id. at 66. Of course, in the last
analysis the failure of price control is found in the undisputed fact that living costs
have risen. See notes I 54, I 5 5, and I 56, infra.
As to the adequacy of taxation, see Hearings on H. R. 73 72, 77th Cong. 2d sess.
(Senate Committee on Finance) (1942), 2200, 314; Hearings on S.J. RES. 161, 77th
Cong., 2d sess. (Senate Committee on Banking and Currency); Groves, "Taxes,
Too Little and Too Late," NEw REPUBLIC,, Oct. 12, 1942, 454. Ruttenberg, "Wages
and the Cost of Living," NEW REPUBLIC, April IO, 1944, 489. As to suggested
taxation techniques, see SHOUP, FRIEDMAN, MAcK, TAXING TO PREVENT INFLATION
(1943), especially Part II; and a study of British techniques, 52 YALE L. J. 400 at
410-415 (1943).
167
See, HAMILTON AND MAY, THE CoNTROL OF WAGES (1927).

